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THE MEANING, HISTORY, AND IMPORTANCE OF THE 
ELECTIONS CLAUSE 
Eliza Sweren-Becker and Michael Waldman* 
Abstract: Historically, the Supreme Court has offered scant attention to or analysis of the 
Elections Clause, resulting in similarly limited scholarship on the Clause’s original meaning 
and public understanding over time. The Clause directs states to make regulations for the time, 
place, and manner of congressional elections, and grants Congress superseding authority to 
make or alter those rules. 
But the 2020 elections forced the Elections Clause into the spotlight, with Republican 
litigants relying on the Clause to ask the Supreme Court to limit which state actors can regulate 
federal elections. This new focus comes on the heels of the Clause serving as the primary 
constitutional basis for democracy reform legislation that passed the U.S. House of 
Representatives in 2019 and was reintroduced in 2021. Increased interest heightens the need 
for a deeper understanding of the intent and meaning of the Elections Clause. This Article fills 
a gap in the literature by providing a first-of-its-kind comprehensive analysis of the purpose, 
meaning, and interpretation of the Elections Clause by the Framers, early Congresses, and 
federal courts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Elections Clause—Article I, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution—
has been rarely studied and infrequently adjudicated. That is changing. 
The Clause provides: “The Times, Places and Manner of holding 
Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each 
State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law 
make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing 
Senators.”1 In other words, the Elections Clause affirmatively directs 
states to regulate federal congressional elections, but reserves to Congress 
the superseding power to make its own regulations or to modify state 
election law. 
It is a provision of extraordinary, if often latent power. Nowhere else 
in the original Constitution is Congress given explicit authority to “alter” 
state laws even absent a conflicting federal statute. It is also one of the 
few places in the Constitution where states are given an explicit 
instruction to act—in this case, to ensure the continuation of the federal 
legislature. Beyond the significance of this exertion of federal power, 
 
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
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what is noteworthy about the Clause is the motive that drove its inclusion: 
a clear-eyed sense of the risk of political abuse by state lawmakers and 
the unambiguous decision not to leave federal elections in their hands 
alone. 
Unexpectedly, the Elections Clause has emerged as the latest voting 
rights battleground. In 2020, litigants filed more than forty cases raising 
Elections Clause and Electors Clause2 claims, largely seeking to limit 
voting access before the election or to overturn results after election day.3 
Unlike bizarre claims about Dominion voting machines and a deceased 
Venezuelan president,4 these cases had the patina of constitutional 
seriousness. Today, in partisan voting rights battles, litigants focus on the 
meaning of the word “legislature,” assuming it to restrict election 
regulation only to elected representatives in each state capitol. They claim, 
variously, that election officials, governors, or even state courts 
interpreting state constitutions cannot act. From the founding era to the 
present, one would have to look far and wide for evidence that the framers 
sought to limit these actions only to legislators (as opposed to 
understanding that language to refer to states generally). Indeed, suspicion 
of those very legislators suffuses the purpose and history of the Clause. 
After four justices—considering voting cases on the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s 2020 “shadow docket”5—suggested that they would limit which 
state entities can regulate federal elections under the Elections and 
 
2. The Electors Clause, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, directs how presidential electors are appointed by 
the states. “[C]ourts have construed the Electors Clause coextensively with the Elections Clause, 
holding that the former endows Congress with the same authority over presidential elections that the 
latter grants it over congressional races.” Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, The Sweep of the Electoral 
Power, 36 CONST. COMMENT. 1, 54 (2021); see also Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 545 
(1934); Voting Rts. Coal. v. Wilson, 60 F.3d 1411, 1414 (9th Cir. 1995) (“The broad power given to 
Congress over congressional elections has been extended to presidential elections . . . .”); Ass’n of 
Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now (ACORN) v. Edgar, 56 F.3d 791, 793 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[Article II 
section 1] has been interpreted to grant Congress power over Presidential elections coextensive with 
that which Article I section 4 grants it over congressional elections.”); Eugene Gressman, Uniform 
Timing of Presidential Primaries, 65 N.C. L. REV. 351, 355 (1987) (“[T]he Court employs the same 
constitutional analysis—the same broad treatment of vested congressional power—in dealing with 
article II, section 1.”). 
3. Voting Rights Litigation Tracker 2020, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (July 8, 2021), https://www. 
brennancenter.org/our-work/court-cases/voting-rights-litigation-tracker-2020 [https://perma.cc/4MD 
M-628K]. 
4. Glenn Kessler, Fact-Checking the Craziest News Conference of the Trump Presidency, WASH. 
POST (Nov. 19, 2020, 2:18 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/11/19/fact-
checking-craziest-news-conference-trump-presidency/ [https://perma.cc/A6WR-8HFS]. 
5. The term “shadow docket,” coined by William Baude, refers to Supreme Court decisions decided 
outside of its regular docket, without oral argument. See William Baude, Foreword: The Supreme 
Court’s Shadow Docket, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1 (2015). 
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Electors Clauses,6 several petitioners sought certiorari to ask the Court to 
limit which state entities can regulate federal elections.7 
At the same time, the Elections Clause serves as the primary 
constitutional rationale for federal democracy reform legislation to 
expand and protect voting access, including the For the People Act, which 
passed the U.S. House of Representatives in 2019 and again in 2021, and 
the Freedom to Vote Act (introduced in the Senate in September 2021).8 
And the Elections Clause took center stage in the Supreme Court’s 2019 
political gerrymandering decision, Rucho v. Common Cause.9 The Clause 
was the subject of a 2015 ruling that allowed voters to enact election 
reforms through ballot initiatives.10 In 2013, the Clause was the basis of a 
case on the scope of the National Voter Registration Act.11 Understanding 
the Elections Clause’s purpose, history, and application over more than 
200 years is now essential. 
Though the Elections Clause generated substantial friction during the 
state constitutional ratification debates from 1787 to 1790, it is not widely 
 
6. See, e.g., Wise v. Circosta, __ U.S. __, 141 S. Ct. 658 (2020) (mem.) (Justices Thomas, Alito, 
and Gorsuch would have granted an application to enjoin the North Carolina State Board of Elections’ 
extension of the state’s absentee ballot receipt deadline. The deadline extension was challenged based 
on the claim that the Board is not the “legislature” under the Elections and Electors Clauses.); 
Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wis. State Legislature, __ U.S. __, 141 S. Ct. 28, 29–30 (2020) (Gorsuch, 
J., concurring) (in denying an application to stay a Seventh Circuit decision—which stayed the district 
court’s order to extend the ballot receipt deadline—Justice Gorsuch, concurring, wrote that state 
legislatures, not judges or other state officials, bear primary responsibility for setting election rules); 
id. at 32 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (Justice Kavanaugh agreed that designing electoral procedures 
is a “legislative task”); Republican Party of Pa. v. Boockvar, __ U.S. __, 141 S. Ct. 643 (2020) (mem.) 
(Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh would have granted an application to stay the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s ruling to extend the mail ballot receipt deadline, which was challenged 
based on the claim that the state court is not the “legislature” under the Elections and Electors 
Clauses).  
7. See generally Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Corman v. Pa. Democratic Party, 592 U.S. __, 141 
S. Ct. 732 (2021) (mem.) (No. 20-574); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Republican Party of Pa. v. 
Degraffenreid, 592 U.S. __, 141 S. Ct. 732 (2021) (mem.) (No. 20-542); Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari, Bognet v. Degraffenreid, __ U.S. __, 209 L. Ed. 2d 544 (2021) (mem.) (No. 20-740), 2021 
WL 1520777. The Court declined to grant certiorari in Corman and Republican Party of Pennsylvania 
v. Degraffenreid. The Court granted certiorari in Bognet before vacating the ruling and instructing the 
lower court to dismiss the case as moot. 
8. For the People Act of 2019, H.R. 1, 116th Cong. (2019); For the People Act of 2021, H.R. 1, 
117th Cong. (2021); Freedom to Vote Act, S. 2747, 117th Cong. (2021). The Brennan Center for 
Justice has advocated in support of the For the People Act, including offering testimony before 
Congress in support of the legislation. 
9. __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019). The Brennan Center for Justice submitted an amicus brief to 
the Court in support of appellees. 
10. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787 (2015). The 
Brennan Center for Justice submitted an amicus brief to the Court in support of appellees. 
11. Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 570 U.S. 1 (2013). The Brennan Center for Justice 
submitted an amicus brief to the Court in support of respondents. 
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known, at least as far as constitutional provisions go. Congress did not 
legislate pursuant to its power under the Elections Clause until 1842,12 and 
the Supreme Court did not elaborate on its meaning until 1879.13 In a 
nearly unbroken string of cases since then, the Court has deemed 
uncontroversial a wide range of elections regulations. But the Court did 
not engage in a robust analysis of the provision’s history until 2013.14 
Given the Court’s scant attention, scholarship on the Clause—especially 
its original meaning and public understanding over time—has been 
limited and is typically directed to the relationship between the Elections 
Clause and a specific issue.15 This Article builds on this literature by 
providing a comprehensive examination of the purpose, meaning, and 
understanding of the Elections Clause over time. 
The full sweep of the history of the Clause—from its drafting to the 
current day—tells a clear story. It was understood from the start to give 
 
12. Act of June 25, 1842, ch. 47, 5 Stat. 491. 
13. Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879). 
14. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 570 U.S. at 7–9. 
15. See, e.g., Jamal Greene, Judging Partisan Gerrymanders Under the Elections Clause, 114 
YALE L.J. 1021 (2005) (justiciability of partisan gerrymandering); Troy McCurry, Leeway for 
Judicial Usurpation: Ignoring the Default of the Elections Clause in the Texas Redistricting Cases, 
25 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 631 (2007) (same); Robert G. Natelson, The Original Scope of the 
Congressional Power to Regulate Elections, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1 (2010) (campaign finance); 
Franita Tolson, Reinventing Sovereignty?: Federalism as a Constraint on the Voting Rights Act, 65 
VAND. L. REV. 1195 (2012) (Elections Clause, when combined with Congress’s ability to enforce the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, provides constitutional justification for the VRA); MICHAEL 
J. KLARMAN, THE FRAMERS’ COUP: THE MAKING OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 340–48 
(2016) (discussing Antifederalist views of and arguments against the Elections Clause); Franita 
Tolson, The Spectrum of Congressional Authority over Elections, 99 B.U. L. REV. 317, 317 (2019) 
[hereinafter Tolson, Congressional Authority] (exploring the breadth of congressional power over 
elections, which derives from multiple sources of congressional authority and should overcome 
federalism concerns); Franita Tolson, The Elections Clause and the Underenforcement of Federal 
Law, 129 YALE L.J. F. 171 (2019) (addressing Congress’s Elections Clause authority to enact the For 
the People Act of 2019 (H.R. 1)); Recent Legislation, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1806 (2020) (addressing 
anti-commandeering under the Elections Clause in the contest of H.R. 1). But see Stephanopoulos, 
supra note 2 (writing more broadly on congressional authority over elections). A separate line of 
scholarship addresses the “independent state legislature” theory. See Michael T. Morley, The 
Independent State Legislature Doctrine, Federal Elections, and State 
Constitutions, 55 GA. L. REV 1 (2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=353013 
6 [https://perma.cc/P5GC-PXHU]; Vikram David Amar, Federal Court Review of State Court 
Interpretations of State Laws that Regulate Federal Elections: Debunking the “Independent State 
Legislature” Notion Once and for All, and Keeping Federal Judges to Their Important but Limited 
Lanes (Nov. 23, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=3731755 [https://perma.cc/NFM4-ZPEC]; Derek T. Muller, Legislative Delegations and the 
Elections Clause, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 717, 726–28, 734 (2016); Michael T. Morley, The New 
Elections Clause, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE 79 (2016); Richard L. Hasen, When 
“Legislature” May Mean More Than “Legislature”: Initiated Electoral College Reform and the 
Ghost of Bush v. Gore, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 599 (2008); Hayward H. Smith, Comment, History 
of the Article II Independent State Legislature Doctrine, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 731 (2001). 
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Congress extraordinary power over federal elections. Some derided it for 
this reason; others welcomed that federal oversight; all took it for granted. 
It was an important, if narrow, aspect of the Constitution’s federalist 
clockwork machinery. From the start, the Elections Clause was motivated 
by great and still-relevant constitutional goals: to guarantee and amplify 
basic democratic rights by ensuring fair and accurate representation, and 
by precluding tactics that could be used by incumbent factions and parties 
to blunt representation and exclude voters. 
Part I analyzes the drafting of the Elections Clause along with the state 
constitutional ratification and public debates on the provision. Part II 
considers the early congressional record and Congress’s understanding of 
its authority under the Elections Clause. Part III explores the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the Clause. And Part VI explains the importance 
of the Elections Clause for today’s legal and political fights about our 
democracy. 
I. THE ELECTIONS CLAUSE AT THE FOUNDING 
A. The Constitutional Convention 
1. The Framers’ Goals 
The Framers’ inclusion of the Elections Clause was driven by two 
overlapping concerns of current relevance: a focus on representation and 
a distrust of state lawmakers. 
First, the Framers cared passionately about representation.16 As every 
American schoolchild knows, a fighting slogan was “No taxation without 
representation.”17 Americans understood the risks of electoral 
manipulation to minimize effective representation—manipulation they 
saw in England, and to a degree in their own pre-revolutionary past. 
During the fight over British repressive acts that led up to the 
revolution, Americans bristled at the notion that they need not be 
represented directly in parliament. Britain insisted that virtual 
representation was enough. In the colonies, where many more people 
owned land and the electorate was a larger share of the population than in 
Britain, especially in the north, actual representation was deemed a 
necessary aspect of legitimate government. 
 
16. See generally J.R. POLE, POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN ENGLAND & THE ORIGINS OF THE 
AMERICAN REPUBLIC (1966).  
17. Grant Dorfman, The Founders’ Legal Case: “No Taxation Without Representation” Versus 
Taxation No Tyranny, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1377, 1378 (2008) (“That ‘no taxation without 
representation’ was the rallying cry of colonists seeking their independence in 1776 is the ‘mother’s 
milk’ of American history education. Generations of schoolchildren have been weaned on it.”). 
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British parliamentary seats were notoriously malapportioned. The 
booming industrial cities of Birmingham and Manchester had no 
representation.18 On the other hand, a verdant hilltop known as Old Sarum 
had a seat in parliament.19 Britain had ample reason to avoid the topic. As 
one historian writes, “Heeding American arguments about representation 
of the colonists in Parliament would open up a Pandora’s box of defective 
representation in Britain.”20 
In American colonies, on the other hand, new towns were awarded 
legislative seats. Larger communities, such as Philadelphia and Boston, 
were awarded extra seats. As tensions rose, the Crown attempted to 
manipulate this practice. In Pennsylvania, it refused to add legislative 
representation when new towns were incorporated. 
John Adams articulated the colonists’ focus on ensuring the 
representative nature of legislatures in his Thoughts on Government, 
written in the spring of 1776 as the Continental Congress was preparing 
to formally declare independence. 
The principal difficulty lies, and the greatest care should be 
employed in constituting this Representative Assembly. It should 
be in miniature, an exact portrait of the people at large. It should 
think, feel, reason, and act like them. That it may be the interest 
of this Assembly to do strict justice at all times, it should be an 
equal representation, or in other words equal interest among the 
people should have equal interest in it.21 
Others echoed Adams’s words.22 
As the revolutionaries established new governments, they kept an eye 
on the need to ensure accurate representation. One pamphlet, possibly 
written by Thomas Paine,23 proposed that “A Constitution should lay 
down some permanent ratio, by which the representation should 
 
18. CHARLES SEYMOUR, ELECTORAL REFORM IN ENGLAND AND WALES 349, 490–91 (1915). 
19. Stephen Farrell, Old Sarum, THE HISTORY OF PARLIAMENT, http://www.historyofparliamento 
nline.org/volume/1820-1832/constituencies/old-sarum [https://perma.cc/5FR8-Y7DD]. 
20. R.B. BERNSTEIN, THE EDUCATION OF JOHN ADAMS 52 (2020). 
21. John Adams, Thoughts on Government, April 1776, NAT’L ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS ONLINE, 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-04-02-0026-0004 [https://perma.cc/FB3E-
YNSE]; JOHN PHILLIP REID, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION IN THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION 50–62 (1989); BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION 161–75 (1967).  
22. See, e.g., THEOPHILUS PARSONS, THE ESSEX RESULT, 1778, reprinted in THE POPULAR 
SOURCES OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY 341 (Oscar Handlin & Mary Flug Handlin eds., 1966) (“They 
should think, feel, and act like them, and in fine, should be an exact miniature of their constituents.”). 
23. See Gary Berton, Smiljana Petrovic, Lubomir Ivanov, & Robert Schiaffino, Examining the 
Thomas Paine Corpus: Automated Computer Authorship Attribution Methodology Applied to Thomas 
Paine’s Writings, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN THOMAS PAINE STUDIES 40–41 (Scott Cleary & Ivy Linton 
Stabell, eds., 2016). 
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afterwards encrease or decrease with the number of inhabitants; for the 
right of representation, which is a natural one, ought not to depend upon 
the will and pleasure of future legislatures.”24 
The second impetus for the inclusion of the Elections Clause came from 
a strong distrust of state lawmakers. During the “Critical Period” between 
the victory in the war and the 1787 gathering in Philadelphia, the newly 
independent states offered ample evidence of the self-dealing and political 
corruption of local-minded officials.25 Indeed, as one Framer put it, the 
Constitutional Convention was appointed specifically because of the 
“corruption & mutability of the Legislative Councils of the States.”26 The 
Constitution was intended to rectify the weak Articles of Confederation, 
under which the national government had little leverage over States. The 
Confederation Congress could not impose taxes, enact statutes, regulate 
international or interstate commerce, or enforce treaty obligations. States 
operated largely out of self-interest. For example, New York enacted its 
own import duties in 1784, generating substantial revenue and keeping its 
property taxes low, leading to the state’s reluctance to approve an 
amendment to the Articles that would have permitted federal taxing.27 
Madison’s diligent preparation for the convention included thorough 
study of all the ways state governments had frustrated the national 
interest.28 That distrust permeated the final Constitution. 
2. Drafting the Elections Clause and Debate at the Constitutional 
Convention 
The Elections Clause came together over the course of fifteen days in 
the summer of 1787. Between July 26 and August 6, a five-member 
 
24. FOUR LETTERS ON INTERESTING SUBJECTS 18–24 (1776), reprinted in 1 THE FOUNDERS’ 
CONSTITUTION 639 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). 
25. See JOHN FISKE, CRITICAL PERIOD OF AMERICAN HISTORY, 1783-1789 (Forgotten Books 2012) 
(1888).  
26. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 288 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) 
[hereinafter 2 Farrand] (notes of James Madison, recording arguments of John Francis Mercer); see 
also Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 352 (2009) 
(“Corruption was discussed more often in the Constitutional Convention than factions, violence, or 
instability.”). 
27. KLARMAN, supra note 15, at 31. 
28. James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States, April 1787, NAT’L 
ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-09-02-0187 
[https://perma.cc/N99 G-Z4XQ]; 5 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE 
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 119–20 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter 5 
ELLIOT’S DEBATES] (noting in the debates of July 25, 1788 that the States repeatedly failed to heed 
the Confederation Congress, failed to fulfill their national obligations, and even tried to keep secret 
their defiance of Congress). 
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Committee of Detail29 pulled together a first draft of the Constitution 
based on the resolutions approved to date.30 Over successive versions, the 
Clause’s broad purpose to protect the integrity of elections came into 
view. 
An early version produced by the Committee of Detail focused only on 
the timing of congressional elections.31 Over the next four drafts, the 
Committee of Detail coalesced around broader language that grew to 
include authority over the manner of elections.32 The sixth draft, 
significantly, introduced the notion that the Clause protects not just the 
frequency of elections, but the qualification of voters.33 But by later drafts, 
the language had been boiled down to a more concise wording.34 When 
John Rutledge (S.C.) delivered the Committee’s report on August 6, the 
Elections Clause read: “The times and places and [the] manner of holding 
the elections of the members of each House shall be prescribed by the 
Legislature of each State; but their provisions concerning them may, at 
any time, be altered by the Legislature of the United States.”35 
As the Clause evolved, the Committee toyed with various roles for 
Congress (the August 6 version did not yet include its power to “make” 
elections regulations, an authority added by amendment on August 9). But 
the drafters consistently preserved Congress’s veto power over state 
regulations of federal elections. 
On August 9, 1787, when the full federal convention considered the 
 
29. The Committee of Detail was comprised of Edmund Randolph, James Wilson, Oliver 
Ellsworth, John Rutledge, and Nathaniel Gorham. See KLARMAN, supra note 15, at 173. 
30. See id. at 147; 2 Farrand, supra note 26, at 129–74. 
31. 2 Farrand, supra note 26, at 135 (“The Time of the Election of the Members of the H. D. and 
of the Meeting of U. S. in C. assembled.”). 
32. Id. at 139 (“The elections shall be biennially held on the same day through the same state(s): 
except in case of accidents, and where an adjournment to the succeeding day may be 
necessary. . . . The place shall be fixed by the (national) legislatures from time to time, or on their 
default by the national legislature. . . . So shall the presiding officer . . . (Votes shall be given by 
ballot, unless 2/3 of the national legislature shall choose to vary the mode.)”) (emphasis in original). 
33. Id. at 153 (Committee of Detail, VI, Article 4: “The Members of the House of Representatives 
shall be chosen every second Year (in the Manner following) by the People of the several States 
comprehended within this Union (the Time and Place and the Manner and the of holding the Elections 
and the Rules) The Qualifications of the Electors shall be (appointed) prescribed by the Legislatures 
of the several States; but their provisions (which they shall make concerning them shall be subject to 
the Control of) concerning them may at any Time be altered and superseded by the Legislature of the 
United States.”) (emphasis in original). 
34. Id. at 165 (Committee of Detail, IX, Article 6: “The Times and Places and the Manner of 
holding the Elections of the Members of each House shall be prescribed by the Legislature of each 
State; but their Provisions concerning them may, at any Time, be altered (or superseded) by the 
Legislature of the United States.”). 
35. Id. at 179. 
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proto-Elections Clause, delegates proposed several amendments.36 
Among the suggested changes was an addition to Congress’s power—the 
authority to make (not just “alter”) regulations for congressional elections. 
In his notes, James Madison explained that the delegates added this 
authority “in case the States should fail or refuse altogether.”37 This fear, 
that states might not set up rules for congressional elections at all, 
permeated state ratification debates and congressional debates all the way 
through Reconstruction. One reason for the provision was the concern that 
state legislators would try to strangle the new government by refusing to 
hold federal elections at all.38 That fear was not far-fetched. Local 
potentates such as Patrick Henry, who dominated the Virginia legislature, 
and George Clinton, who held sway in Albany as New York’s governor, 
would prove the new Constitution’s most dogged foes.39 There was a risk 
the whole experiment could collapse. 
One of the amendments proposed that day generated meaningful 
debate. John Rutledge and Charles Pinckney represented South Carolina, 
a state with a notoriously malapportioned legislature, with large coastal 
plantations far better represented than newly populated inland areas.40 
They moved to strike from the Elections Clause the phrase, “but their 
provisions concerning them may at any time be altered by the Legislature 
of the United States.”41 According to Madison’s notes, Rutledge and 
Pinckney argued that the “States . . . could & must be relied on in such 
cases.”42 The delegates from the nascent union’s most gerrymandered 
state (before that word was invented) aimed to strike Congress’s power to 
do anything about it. 
Several delegates rose to defend the congressional veto. Nathaniel 
Ghorum remarked that the absence of congressional authority over 
elections would be just as improper as county control over British 
parliamentary elections.43 Rufus King warned that the absence of a 
congressional override would repeat the mistakes of the Articles of 
 
36. Id. at 229. 
37. Id. at 242. 
38. See infra notes 57–62 and accompanying text. 
39. See infra notes 59, 77, 84. 
40. The western “back country” contained as much as seventy-five percent of the colony’s white 
population and was settled by yeoman farmers who enslaved relatively few people. James Haw, 
Political Representation in South Carolina, 1669-1794: Evolution of a Lowcountry Tradition, 103 
S.C. HIST. MAG. 106, 112 (2002). As described in greater detail infra section I.B.1, South Carolina’s 
malapportionment was repeatedly offered as an example during state ratification debates to 
demonstrate the need for superseding congressional authority under the Elections Cause.  
41. 2 Farrand, supra note 26, at 240. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
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Confederation.44 Following King’s rejection of the “dangerous” and 
“fatal” idea that the federal government should depend on state 
lawmakers, Gouverneur Morris warned that, without congressional 
authority, states might make “false returns” and then fail to hold new 
elections.45 Roger Sherman expressed “sufficient confidence in the State 
Legislatures,” but still approved of congressional authority.46 
Madison offered the most extensive defense (at least according to his 
own notes), along with an explanation of the purpose and scope of the 
Elections Clause.47 He described the Clause as containing “words of great 
latitude,” stressing the many ways that states could misuse their 
authority.48 And recognizing that state lawmakers would abuse their 
power in ways that were impossible to predict at the time, he warned that 
the Elections Clause was needed to prevent self-interested partisans from 
twisting election rules to benefit their faction. Given its singular 
importance, we quote Madison’s defense of the provision in full: 
The necessity of a Genl. Govt. supposes that the State 
Legislatures will sometimes fail or refuse to consult the common 
interest at the expense of their local conveniency or prejudices. 
The policy of referring the appointment of the House of 
Representatives to the people and not to the Legislatures of the 
States, supposes that the result will be somewhat influenced by 
the mode, This view of the question seems to decide that the 
Legislatures of the States ought not to have the uncontrouled right 
of regulating the times places & manner of holding elections. 
These were words of great latitude. It was impossible to foresee 
all the abuses that might be made of the discretionary power. 
Whether the electors should vote by ballot or vivâ voce, should 
assemble at this place or that place; should be divided into 
districts or all meet at one place, shd all vote for all the 
representatives; or all in a district vote for a number allotted to the 
district; these & many other points would depend on the 
Legislatures. and might materially affect the appointments. 
Whenever the State Legislatures had a favorite measure to carry, 
they would take care so to mould their regulations as to favor the 
 
44. Id. at 241.  
45. Id.  
46. Id.  
47. Madison requested that his notes be published posthumously, a full half century later in 1840. 
See THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON (Henry D. Gilpin ed., 1840); James H. Hutson, The Creation of 
the Constitution: The Integrity of the Documentary Record, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1, 24 (1986). Madison 
was known to have edited and “improved” the transcripts, including his own contributions. Hutson, 
supra, at 25–35; KLARMAN, supra note 15, at 135–36. 
48. 2 Farrand, supra note 26, at 240–41. 
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candidates they wished to succeed. Besides, the inequality of the 
Representation in the Legislatures of particular States, would 
produce a like inequality in their representation in the Natl. 
Legislature, as it was presumable that the Counties having the 
power in the former case would secure it to themselves in the 
latter. What danger could there be in giving a controuling power 
to the Natl. Legislature? Of whom was it to consist? 1. of a Senate 
to be chosen by the State Legislatures. If the latter therefore could 
be trusted, their representatives could not be dangerous. 2. of 
Representatives elected by the same people who elect the State 
Legislatures; surely then if confidence is due to the latter, it must 
be due to the former. It seemed as improper in principle — though 
it might be less inconvenient in practice, to give to the State 
Legislatures this great authority over the election of the 
Representatives of the people in the Genl. Legislature, as it would 
be to give to the latter a like power over the election of their 
Representatives in the State Legislatures.49 
Particularly focused on fair representation, Madison echoed these 
concerns during the Virginia ratification debates a year later, “Elections 
are regulated now unequally in some States; particularly South-Carolina, 
with respect to Charleston, which is represented by 30 Members.”50 
Madison’s denunciation of the likely machinations of self-interested 
state politicians seemed to have stilled the debate in Philadelphia. He 
recorded no subsequent interjections. Before moving on to consider other 
provisions of the new Constitution, the delegates agreed to the Elections 
Clause. The vote was unanimous.51 
B. Ratification of the Constitution 
Publication of the Constitution in September 1787 led to a roaring 
national debate. Antifederalists cautioned that the Constitution would 
concentrate too much power in the new central government. The Elections 
Clause was one target for their fire. Antifederalists warned the provision 
would let Congress manipulate elections. In his pathbreaking 1961 study 
of the debate over ratification, historian Jackson Turner Main observed 
that this seemingly frivolous objection to the Elections Clause was “of 
 
49. Id. at 240–41. 
50. THE VIRGINIA CONVENTION: DEBATES (JUNE 14, 1788), reprinted in 10 RATIFICATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION BY THE STATES: VIRGINIA [3], at 1259–60 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1993) 
[hereinafter VOL. 10 VIRGINIA 3] (emphasis in original). 
51. 2 Farrand, supra note 26, at 242. 
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great importance, judging from the number of times it was introduced.”52 
1. State Ratification Debates 
Records indicate the Elections Clause was discussed at the ratification 
conventions in nine of thirteen states53 and was the subject of proposed 
amendments from at least six states. Every state that proposed specific 
amendments included one to trim or eliminate the clause.54 
Defenders of the Elections Clause repeatedly expressed an unvarnished 
distrust of state legislatures. For example, in Massachusetts, George Cabot 
argued that if state lawmakers exclusively regulated congressional 
elections “they may at first diminish, and finally annihilate that controul 
[sic] of the general government, which the people ought always to have 
through their immediate representatives—as one of the people, . . . the 4th 
section is to be as highly prized as any in the constitution.”55 Others 
warned against relying, even “for a moment, on the will of state 
legislatures,” and expressed concern about state lawmakers trying to 
exercise “undue influence in elections” and making “improper 
regulations” arising from “sinister views.”56 
 
52. JACKSON TURNER MAIN, THE ANTIFEDERALISTS: CRITICS OF THE CONSTITUTION, 1781–1788, 
at 149–51 (2d ed. 2017). 
53. No such debate was found in records of the Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, and New Jersey 
ratification debates (in Elliot’s Debates or the Documentary History of the Ratification of the 
Constitution). These four states ratified the Constitution most quickly. The vote was unanimous in 
Delaware, Georgia, and New Jersey; in Connecticut, the margin in favor of ratification was more than 
three to one. KLARMAN, supra note 15, at 422–23. 
54. MAIN, supra note 52, at 151. 
55. THE MASSACHUSETTS CONVENTION: CONVENTION DEBATES (Jan. 16, 1788), reprinted in 6 
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE STATES: MASSACHUSETTS [3], at 1217 (John P. 
Kaminski et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter VOL. 6: MASSACHUSETTS 3] (emphasis in original). 
56. THE NEW YORK CONVENTION: DEBATES (June 25, 1788), in 22 RATIFICATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION BY THE STATES: NEW YORK [4], at 1906 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2008) 
[hereinafter VOL. 22: NEW YORK 4] (“Richard Morris suggested that so far as the people, distinct 
from their legislatures, were concerned in the operation of the constitution, it was absolutely necessary 
that the existence of the general government should not depend, for a moment, on the will of the state 
legislatures. The power of perpetuating the government ought to belong to their federal 
representatives; otherwise, the rights of the people would be essentially abridged.”); Plain Truth: 
Reply to an Officer of the Late Continental Army, INDEPENDENT GAZETTEER, Nov. 10, 1788, 
reprinted in 2 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE STATES: PENNSYLVANIA 222 (Merrill 
Jensen ed., 1976) [hereinafter VOL. 2: PENNSYLVANIA] (“Congress indeed are to have control to 
prevent undue influence in elections, which we all know but too often happens through party zeal.”); 
Text of a Federalist Speech Not Delivered in the Maryland Convention, MD. J. (July 21, 1788), 
reprinted in 12 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE STATES: MARYLAND [2], at 884 (John 
P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2015) (“It has been said, that congress will be more likely to make improper 
regulations, than the general assembly. But that is an assertion without foundation, because although 
we may easily suppose improper regulations to take place in a state assembly, from the prevalence 
and sinister views of a party . . . .”). 
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Backers worried that balky states would simply refuse to participate in 
federal elections.57 Rhode Island’s refusal to send delegates to Congress 
and the Constitutional Convention was top-of-mind.58 Indeed, in New 
York, supporters of George Clinton would manage to stall the first House 
election in two districts in 1788.59 At times, supporters assured anti-
federalists that the purpose of the Clause was simply to ensure that states 
held elections. At the first ratification convention the prominent lawyer 
James Wilson claimed the Clause was needed for “the very existence of 
the federal government.”60 The authority would not be abused because 
Congress would act only “to correct the improper regulations of a 
particular state.”61 James Iredell attempted to soothe critics by explaining 
that the provision would only be used when states failed to hold elections, 
such as in case of a military invasion (and even proposed an amendment 
along those lines).62 
But many federalists, as well as antifederalists, saw the power given to 
Congress to be far more sweeping than just one to be used if a state refused 
to hold elections. Just as at the Constitutional Convention, proponents 
warned that powerful factions within states would use unchecked control 
over elections to gerrymander districts and entrench their power. 
 
57. See Roger Sherman, A Citizen of New Haven, CONN. COURANT, Jan. 7, 1788, reprinted in 3 
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE STATES: DELAWARE, NEW JERSEY, GEORGIA, 
CONNECTICUT 526 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1978) [hereinafter VOL. 3 DELAWARE, NEW JERSEY, 
GEORGIA, CONNECTICUT] (“The regulating the time, place, and manner of elections seems to be as 
well secured as possible. The legislature of each state may do it, and if they neglect to do it in the best 
manner, it may be done by Congress; and what motive can either have to injure the people in the 
exercise of that right?”); Letter from Samuel Holden Parsons to William Cushing (Jan. 11, 1788), 
reprinted in VOL. 3 DELAWARE, NEW JERSEY, GEORGIA, CONNECTICUT, supra, at 569; THE 
PENNSYLVANIA CONVENTION: PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION, reprinted in VOL. 
2: PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 56, at 402–03, 406 (statements of James Wilson); 4 THE DEBATES IN 
THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 60 (Jonathan 
Elliot ed., 2d ed., 1836) [hereinafter 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES] (“It would have been a solecism, to have 
a government without any means of self-preservation. The Confederation is the only instance of a 
government without such means, and is a nerveless system, as inadequate to every purpose of 
government as it is to the security of the liberties of the people of America. When the councils of 
America have this power over elections, they can, in spite of any faction in any particular state, give 
the people a representation.”) (replicating a statement of William R. Davie) (emphasis in original). 
58. See THEOPHILUS PARSONS: NOTES OF CONVENTION DEBATES (Jan. 16, 1788), reprinted in 
VOL. 6: MASSACHUSETTS 3, supra note 55, at 1210–11 (noting Theodore Sedgwick’s statement: “But 
this controlling power is necessary to preserve the general government . . . Attend to the conduct of 
Rhode Island last winter; without any reason, they recalled their delegate and refused to send any. 
The same may happen under the general government”); 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 57 (noting 
the statement of William R. Davie addressing “the little state of Rhode Island”). 
59. FORREST MCDONALD, THE PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 7 (1974).  
60. Proceedings and Debates of the Convention, reprinted in VOL. 2: PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 
56, at 565 (Dec. 11, 1787). 
61. Id. at 565–66. 
62. 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 57, at 53–54. 
Sweren-Becker & Waldman (Do Not Delete) 10/11/2021  4:05 PM 
2021] THE ELECTIONS CLAUSE 1011 
 
Theophilus Parsons, who later became Massachusetts’s chief justice, 
spoke at the commonwealth’s ratifying convention in January 1788. 
During the ratification debate, he warned of abuse in prescient and eerily 
modern language: 
But a state legislature, under the influence of their senators, who 
would have their fullest confidence, or under the influence of 
ambitious or popular characters, or in times of popular 
commotion, and when faction and party spirit run high, would 
introduce such regulations as would render the rights of the 
people insecure and of little value. They might make an unequal 
and partial division of the State into districts for the election of 
representatives, or they might even disqualify one third of the 
electors. Without these powers in Congress, the people can have 
no remedy[.]63 
The Elections Clause, Parsons explained, “provides a remedy—A 
controuling power in a legislature, composed of senators and 
representatives of twelve States, without the influence of our commotions 
and factions, who will hear impartially, and preserve and restore to the 
people their equal and sacred rights of election.”64 According to Parsons, 
the Elections Clause vested superseding power in Congress to “secur[e] 
to the people their equal rights of election.”65 
Indeed, federalists warned that voter suppression tactics by state 
lawmakers would make it harder for voters to be heard. For example, 
James Wilson, arguing for the Constitution, noted with a shiver that 
Pennsylvania’s elections could be moved to far-west Pittsburgh.66 Thomas 
McKean (Pennsylvania’s chief justice) asked, if States directed that votes 
be cast by voice, Congress must be authorized to change that mode to 
secret ballot “to preserve the suffrages of the citizens from bias and 
influence[.]”67 He later explained that it is Congress’s duty to ensure that 
its members were “fairly chosen” and, to do so, “it is proper they should 
have it in their power to provide that the times, places, and manner of 
election should be such as to insure free and fair elections.”68 One 
Massachusetts commentator explained, a state “might abuse the 
inhabitants, by appointing a place for holding the elections, which would 
prevent some from attending, and burthen [sic] others with very great 
inconveniences. These are cases in which the supreme power must 
 
63. VOL. 6: MASSACHUSETTS 3, supra note 55, at 1218. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 1217. 
66. VOL. 2: PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 56, at 403. 
67. Id. at 413. 
68. Id. at 537. 
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interpose, and abuses which none but it can rectify.”69 
In particular, Elections Clause proponents sought to avoid the 
malapportionment that had plagued England and reemerged in South 
Carolina. One essayist explained that, in England, 
the people have by no means an equal representation, even in the 
house of commons, the only popular branch of their legislature. 
The old, decayed, and almost forgotten borough of Sarum, sends 
two members to parliament, when Bristol, the second town in the 
kingdom, sends only two. London, which contains at least the 
seventh part of the inhabitants of England, does not furnish the 
hundredth part of the representation in parliament.70 
Early in 1788, at the Massachusetts ratification, Rufus King described that 
under South Carolina’s constitution, Charleston held a disproportionate 
number of seats in the state’s General Assembly and refused to “alter[] of 
this unequal mode of representation” even though the population had 
grown in “[t]he back parts of Carolina.”71 If South Carolina’s legislature 
had unchecked power to draw congressional districts, congressional 
“representatives, therefore, from that State, will not be chosen by the 
people, but will be the representatives of a faction of that State.”72 King 
then asked, “[i]f the general government cannot control in this case, how 
are the people secure?”73 
In addition, federalists urged national uniformity.74 According to one 
Maryland commenter, the “great object” of the Framers at the convention 
“appears to have been, to institute a government as uniform and equal in 
all its parts, as could be accomplished. It was foreseen that the states, by 
different regulations with regard to the above recited instances, might 
obstruct that uniformity, and occasion great inconveniences.”75 
 
69. Remarker ad Corrigendum, INDEP. CHRON., Jan. 17, 1788, reprinted in 5 RATIFICATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION BY THE STATES: MASSACHUSETTS [2], at 738 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1998) 
[hereinafter VOL. 5: MASSACHUSETTS 2]; see also 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 57, at 54 
(explaining that the Elections Clause “might also be useful . . . lest a few powerful states should 
combine, and make regulations concerning elections which might deprive many of the fair exercise 
of their rights, and thus injure the community, and occasion great dissatisfaction.”). 
70. Caroliniensis, CHARLESTON CITY GAZETTE, 1, Apr. 2, 1788, reprinted in 27 RATIFICATION OF 
THE CONSTITUTION BY THE STATES: SOUTH CAROLINA 240 (John P. Kaminski et al eds., 2016) 
[hereinafter VOL. 27: SOUTH CAROLINA]. 
71. 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 267–68 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) 
(Jan. 21, 1788, Massachusetts Convention). 
72. Id. at 268. 
73. Id. 
74. 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 57, at 60 (statement of William R. Davie); VOL. 10: VIRGINIA 
3, supra note 50, at 1259 (statement of James Madison). 
75. ARATUS: TO THE PEOPLE OF MARYLAND, reprinted in 11 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 
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Uniformity as to the time of elections, in particular, would ensure there 
would always be a quorum in the House, including during periods of 
emergency.76 
Madison made his own arguments at the pivotal, contentious Virginia 
ratifying convention, consistent with his statement at the Constitutional 
Convention and the reasoning of his federalist colleagues in other states. 
For days, Madison defended the Constitution against assault from Patrick 
Henry, George Mason, and other prominent foes. Henry warned that the 
Elections Clause could “totally destroy the end of suffrage” if Congress 
sets the election at a place “the most inconvenient in the state” or far from 
where voters live.77 James Monroe (who would soon face Madison in the 
first congressional election) challenged the Clause. He asked why 
regulation of congressional elections was under the “ultimate controul” of 
the national legislature.78 At Charlottesville, Madison set out his view of 
the broad purposes behind the Clause, beyond whether states held 
elections at all. State regulation of congressional elections, he declared, 
“should be uniform throughout the Continent. Some states might regulate 
the elections on the principles of equality, and others might regulate them 
otherwise. This diversity would be obviously unjust.”79 Critiquing South 
Carolina’s malapportionment,80 he added, “[s]hould the people of any 
State, by any means be deprived of the right of suffrage, it was judged 
proper that it should be remedied by the General Government.”81 
Antifederalists waged repeated attacks. The Elections Clause, they 
argued, granted Congress too much power. One Massachusetts delegate 
remarked that the Clause would “make Congress omnipotent.”82 A North 
Carolina delegate called the provision “reprehensible” and predicted that 
it could cause “state legislatures [to] entirely decay away.”83 In Virginia, 
Patrick Henry claimed that the control “given to Congress over the time, 
place, and manner of holding elections, will totally destroy the end of 
suffrage.”84 And the dissenting minority in Pennsylvania warned that 
 
BY THE STATES: MARYLAND [1], at 38 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2015) (emphasis in original) 
(thought to be authored by George Lux). 
76. THE VIRGINIA CONVENTION: DEBATES (JUNE 4, 1788), reprinted in 9 RATIFICATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION BY THE STATES: VIRGINIA [2], at 920–21 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1990) 
[hereinafter VOL. 9: VIRGINIA 2] (statement of George Nicholas). 
77. Id. at 964. 
78. VOL. 10: VIRGINIA 3, supra note 50, at 1259. 
79. Id. at 1260. 
80. 2 Farrand, supra note 26, at 242. 
81. Id. 
82. VOL. 6: MASSACHUSETTS 3, supra note 55, at 1398–99. 
83. 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 57, at 50–51. 
84. VOL. 9: VIRGINIA 2, supra note 76, at 964–65. 
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when the spirit of the people shall be gradually broken; when the 
general government shall be firmly established, and when a 
numerous standing army shall render opposition vain, the 
Congress may complete the system of despotism, in renouncing 
all dependence on the people, by continuing themselves, and 
[their] children in the government.85 
Opponents warned that members of Congress could entrench themselves 
by situating polling places at inconvenient locations,86 and they advanced 
similar arguments in published essays and private letters.87 One opponent, 
John Steele in North Carolina, addressed these concerns by highlighting 
the newly powerful federal judiciary; if Congress enacted Elections 
Clause legislation that was “inconsistent with the Constitution, 
independent judges will not uphold them[.]”88 Many proposed that 
 
85. THE DISSENT OF THE MINORITY OF THE CONVENTION (DEC. 18, 1787), reprinted in VOL. 2: 
PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 56, at 629–30. 
86. See, e.g., THE SOUTH CAROLINA GENERAL ASSEMBLY CALLS A STATE CONVENTION (JAN. 19, 
1788), reprinted in VOL. 27: SOUTH CAROLINA, supra note 70, at 167 (statement of Charles 
Pinckney); VOL. 10: VIRGINIA 3, supra note 50, at 1290–91 (June 14, 1788) (denoting George 
Mason’s concerns that Congress could establish polling place at inconvenient locations); VOL. 6: 
MASSACHUSETTS 3, supra note 55, at 1409 (Feb. 2, 1788) (undelivered speech by Timothy Winn); 
see also VOL. 2: PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 56, at 510 (Dec. 6, 1787); 2 THE DEBATES IN THE 
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 30–32 (Jonathan 
Elliot ed., 2d ed., 1836) [hereinafter 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES]; 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 57, at 
70. 
87. See An Officer of the Late Continental Army, PHILA. INDEP. GAZETTEER, Nov. 6, 1787, 
reprinted in VOL. 2: PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 56, at 210; Consider Arms, Malachi Maynard & 
Samuel Field, Dissent to the Massachusetts Convention, HAMPSHIRE GAZETTE, Apr. 16, 1788, at 9, 
reprinted in 7 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE STATES: MASSACHUSETTS [4], at 1734–
35 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2001); Samuel, INDEP. CHRON., Jan. 10, 1788, reprinted in VOL. 5: 
MASSACHUSETTS 2, supra note 69, at 680 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1998); Brutus, VA. INDEP. 
CHRON., May 14, 1788, reprinted in VOL. 9: VIRGINIA 2, supra note 76, at 802; A Farmer and Planter, 
MD. J., Apr. 1, 1788, reprinted in 12 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE STATES: 
MARYLAND [2], at 467 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2015); Letter from John Brown Cutting to 
William Short (Dec. 13, 1787), in 14 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION [2], at 479 (John P. 
Kaminski et al. eds., 2009). 
88. 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 57, at 71; see also Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 16 (1964). 
Judicial review was not foreign to the Framers, even if finding legislation unconstitutional was 
atypical. See Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Origins of Judicial Review, 70 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 887, 891, 927–82 (2003) (noting that “there is a wealth of evidence that the Founders believed 
that the courts could exercise some form of judicial review over federal statutes” and presenting such 
evidence, including review of state statutes); Gordon S. Wood, The Origins of Judicial Review 
Revisited, or How the Marshall Court Made More Out of Less, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 787, 798 
(1999) (“[F]or many Americans in the 1790s judicial review of some sort did exist. But it remained 
an extraordinary and solemn political action . . . .”). In the years before Marbury v. Madison, judicial 
review particularly reflected distrust of state lawmakers, as “exercises of judicial review served to 
keep state legislatures, rather than Congress, in check.” William Michael Treanor, Judicial Review 
Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 455, 459 (2005). Notably, in a case shortly after ratification in 
which a circuit court struck down a state statute (unrelated to elections), the court made the case for 
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Congress’s power to regulate should only be triggered by a state’s 
complete failure to enact federal election regulations.89 Generally, they 
assumed that would require a rewrite of the Clause. The Pennsylvania 
antifederalist Samuel Bryan (or his father, George) suggested that the 
language of the Clause already limited Congress’s authority to apply only 
in cases of state default,90 and John Jay of New York seemed to have 
understood the Clause in the same manner.91 But that interpretation was 
belied by the fact that, upon ratifying the Constitution, nearly half of all 
states proposed amendments to limit Congress’s power to occasions of 
state default or, in Massachusetts and New Hampshire, if states acted in a 
way that was “subversive of the rights of the people to a free and equal 
representation in Congress.”92 Ultimately, however, those amendment 
efforts failed. 
2. Federalist Papers 
During the state debates, Madison, along with Alexander Hamilton and 
John Jay, made the case for ratifying the new Constitution in the Federalist 
Papers. In Federalist Papers Nos. 59, 60, and 61, published in late 
February 1788, Hamilton addressed “the Power of Congress to Regulate 
 
judicial review by arguing that state lawmakers “surely” could not make election laws that 
contravened a state’s constitution. VanHorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 309 (C.C.D. 
Pa. 1795) (“Could the Legislature have annulled these articles, respecting . . . elections by ballot? 
Surely no. As to these points there was no devolution of power; the authority was purposely withheld, 
and reserved by the people to themselves. . . . The Constitution of a State is stable and permanent, not 
to be worked upon by the temper of the times . . . ”). But see Rucho v. Common Cause, __ U.S. __, 
139 S. Ct. 2484, 2496 (2019) (“The Framers were aware of electoral districting problems and 
considered what to do about them. . . . At no point was there a suggestion that the federal courts had 
a role to play. Nor was there any indication that the Framers had ever heard of courts doing such a 
thing.”). 
89. See VOL. 6: MASSACHUSETTS 3, supra note 55, at 1213–22; 26 RATIFICATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION BY THE STATES: RHODE ISLAND [3], at 920–21 [hereinafter VOL. 26: RHODE ISLAND] 
(debates of Mar. 3, 1790); 23 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE STATES: NEW YORK [5], 
at 2206 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2009) (debates of July 17, 1788); Letter from David Ramsay to 
Benjamin Rush (Nov. 10, 1787), reprinted in VOL. 27: SOUTH CAROLINA, at 38 (John P. Kaminski et 
al. eds., 2009).  
90. See, e.g., Centinel I, PHILA. INDEP. GAZETTEER, Oct. 5, 1787, reprinted in VOL. 2: 
PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 60, at 163–64 (“The plain construction of [Art. I, Sec. 4] is, that when 
the state legislatures drop out of sight, from the necessary operation of this government, then Congress 
are to provide for the election and appointment of Representatives and Senators.”) (quoting who is 
thought to be Samuel Bryan) 
91.  VOL. 22: NEW YORK 4, supra note 56, at 1905 (June 25, 1788). 
92. See 1 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION 322, 325–26, 329–30 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed., 1836); see also 4 ELLIOT’S 
DEBATES, supra note 57, at 246; VOL. 26: RHODE ISLAND, supra note 89, at 999–1000 (Rhode Island 
Form of Ratification and Amendments); 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 86, at 545 (meeting at 
Harrisburg, after Pennsylvania had ratified the Constitution).  
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the Election of Members”93 and rebutted objections to that power.94 These 
articles are illuminating, though they are somewhat misleading in their 
narrow focus on what to do if states fail to hold elections. 
In Federalist No. 59, Hamilton was charged with defending the 
congressional veto found in the Elections Clause. Hamilton affirmed that 
Congress must have the authority to regulate the election of its own 
members because “EVERY GOVERNMENT OUGHT TO CONTAIN 
IN ITSELF THE MEANS OF ITS OWN PRESERVATION.”95 Hamilton 
made no attempt to disguise his distrust of state lawmakers: 
Nothing can be more evident, than that an exclusive power of 
regulating elections for the national government, in the hands of 
the State legislatures, would leave the existence of the Union 
entirely at their mercy. They could at any moment annihilate it, 
by neglecting to provide for the choice of persons to administer 
its affairs.96 
Hamilton also offered a rationale for why the Elections Clause uses 
“words of great latitude.”97 No specific regulation “would have been 
always applicable to every probable change in the situation of the 
country.”98 Therefore, “a discretionary power over elections” was 
preferable to a more specific provision that would later require a 
constitutional amendment to change.99 
In Federalist No. 60, Hamilton addressed fears that the Elections 
Clause conferred on Congress the power to “promote the election of some 
favorite class of men in exclusion of others.”100 Concerns that Congress 
could effectively select its members by setting polling places at 
inconvenient locations were “chimerical.”101 A “victorious and 
overbearing majority” might, “in certain turbulent and factious seasons,” 
violate the right to vote for “a particular class of citizens.”102 But Hamilton 
was confident that such a manipulation by Congress—if it affected “the 
 
93. THE FEDERALIST NO. 59 (Alexander Hamilton). 
94. Id. NOS. 59–61 (Alexander Hamilton). 
95. Id. NO. 59 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis in original). 
96. Id. (“With so effectual a weapon in their hands as the exclusive power of regulating elections 
for the national government, a combination of a few such men . . . might accomplish the destruction 
of the Union, by seizing the opportunity of some casual dissatisfaction among the people (and which 
perhaps they may themselves have excited), to discontinue the choice of members for the federal 
House of Representatives.”). 
97. 2 Farrand, supra note 26, at 240–41; THE FEDERALIST NO. 59 (Alexander Hamilton). 
98. THE FEDERALIST NO. 59 (Alexander Hamilton). 
99. Id. 
100. Id. NO. 60 (Alexander Hamilton). 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
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great mass of the people”—would occasion a “popular revolution” led by 
State governments.103 He dismissed the worry that Congress would favor, 
say, landowners over merchants, because the House of Representatives 
would be made up of diverse members with varying interests.104 Nor could 
Congress regulate elections to accommodate the rich because “the 
wealthy and the well-born” were not concentrated in particular locations, 
but were instead “scattered over the face of the country as avarice or 
chance may have happened to cast their own lot or that of their 
predecessors.”105 The Constitution had avoided giving Congress the 
power to restrict voting to property owners because the power granted by 
the Elections Clause is “expressly restricted to the regulation of the 
TIMES, the PLACES, the MANNER of elections.”106 
In Federalist No. 61, Hamilton noted that states were more likely than 
Congress to abuse their elections authority to favor a particular class of 
electors.107 Congress could establish uniformity, particularly as to the time 
of electing House members.108 And although uniformity would be most 
easily achieved by a constitutional provision setting a date for federal 
elections, Hamilton explained that “if a time had been appointed, it might, 
upon experiment, have been found less convenient than some other 
time.”109 Nevertheless, Hamilton argued that Congress’s flexible time 
power would facilitate uniformity as to the time of elections, enabling the 
House to assemble at a particular period each year and allowing citizens 
to vote out the entirety of the House at one time, if an “improper spirit” 
prevailed on all its members.110 
II. EARLY CONGRESSIONAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE 
ELECTIONS CLAUSE 
A. The First Fifty Years 
In the first five decades after the ratification of the Constitution, 
Congress enacted no legislation pursuant to its authority under the 
Elections Clause. However, Congress was far from silent. In debates 
about proposed constitutional amendments and contested House 
 
103. Id. 
104. Id.  
105. Id. 
106. Id. (emphasis in original). 
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elections, lawmakers consistently embraced broad conclusions about the 
Clause’s meaning, recognizing that it empowered Congress to supersede 
state provisions for congressional elections, even if states had not 
defaulted on their duty to hold such elections. 
1. The First Congress (1789) 
The original public meaning of the Clause—that it gave Congress 
sweeping power and aimed to curb abuse by state lawmakers—was 
evident in congressional debates held just a few months after ratification. 
In 1789, the First Congress rejected a constitutional amendment that 
would have let Congress “alter, modify, or interfere in the times, places, 
or manner” of congressional elections only “when any State shall refuse 
or neglect, or be unable, by invasion or rebellion, to make such 
election.”111 Introduced by antifederalist Aedanus Burke of South 
Carolina as the House considered what became the Bill of Rights, the 
proposal instigated debate that mirrored the ratification debates. As Fisher 
Ames, Chair of the House Committee on Elections, stressed, “such an 
amendment as was now proposed would alter the Constitution: it would 
vest the supreme authority in places where it was never contemplated.”112 
“[T]he constitution,” Madison maintained, “stands very well as it is.”113 
By denouncing the constitutional status quo, the amendment’s 
antifederalist proponents confirmed that the Elections Clause conferred 
unilateral, plenary power upon Congress – going beyond whether states 
held elections at all. Elbridge Gerry (Mass.) condemned the provision as 
granting Congress unchecked authority over its own elections—the power 
of “controlling the elections of the people.”114 The Elections Clause, he 
warned, enabled Congress to “abolish the mode of balloting,” require that 
“every person must publicly announce his vote,” or move the polls to 
“remote places.”115 Notably, none of the critics contested that Congress 
could revise state laws for congressional elections as it saw fit or that 
“manner” conveyed comprehensive control, including over balloting and 
 
111. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 797–802 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). 
112. Id. at 800. 
113. Id. at 798. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. at 797–98. Michael Stone of Maryland endorsed the amendment on the ground that the 
federal government should not have “the power of determining on the mode of their own election.” 
Id. at 798. Thomas Tucker of South Carolina lamented that the Elections Clause granted Congress the 
power to decide for itself whether and how states should district for House elections. “It had been 
supposed by some States, that electing by districts was the most convenient mode of choosing 
members to this House; others have thought that the whole State ought to vote for the whole number 
of members to be elected for that State,” Tucker observed. “Congress might, under like impressions, 
set their regulations aside.” Id. at 801. 
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districting.116 
Madison, Sherman, and others did not dispute critics’ claim of 
sweeping congressional power. Rather, they argued those powers were 
integral to the Constitution’s design. “The Convention were very 
unanimous in passing this clause,” Sherman insisted, noting that “it was 
an important provision, and if it was resigned it would tend to subvert the 
Government.”117 Madison warned that limiting congressional power over 
elections would “destroy the principles and the efficacy of the 
Constitution.”118 The purpose was broad: “as much injury might result to 
the Union from improper regulations, as from a neglect or refusal to many 
any” and “inadequate regulations were equally injurious as having 
none.”119 In this spirit, Theodore Sedgwick (later Speaker of the House) 
proposed a compromise amendment that would have let Congress “alter 
the times, manner, and places of holding elections, provided the States 
made improper ones.”120 Ames argued that the elections power was “one 
of the most justifiable of all the powers of Congress” because “it was 
essential to a body representing the whole community, that they should 
have power to regulate their own elections, in order to secure a 
representation from every part, and prevent any improper regulations, 
calculated to answer party purposes only.”121 
2. Rejected Constitutional Amendments (1801 and 1823) 
In the coming decades, Congress would twice more reject proposed 
amendments that sought to change the Elections Clause. Its decision 
confirmed the founding-era view that the clause confers upon Congress 
discretionary, plenary, and superseding authority over congressional 
elections. 
In 1801, Congress set aside a proposal to amend the Constitution to 
require that House members be elected from single-member districts in 
each state “in the manner which the Legislature thereof shall prescribe.”122 
The House Committee on Elections concluded that the amendment would 
be “superfluous and inconvenient” because requiring single-member 
districts was “already within the limits of the legislative authority of the 
Government of the United States . . . , to which recurrence may be had at 
 
116. Id. at 797–802. 
117. Id. at 800. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. (statements of Reps. Theodore Sedgwick (Mass.) and Fisher Ames (Mass.)). 
120. Id. 
121. Id. at 797. 
122. 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 785 (1801). 
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all times . . . as the public good or convenience may require.”123 Further, 
the Committee worried that adopting the amendment would “indirectly 
tend to withdraw from the Government of the United States its existing 
control” over House elections by reassigning control of their “manner” to 
the States.124 
In 1823, Congress rejected a proposed constitutional amendment that 
similarly would have required uniform House elections by single-member 
districts.125 A special committee urged the House to reduce both 
congressional and state legislative power over federal elections because 
that power was so vast that factions at either level could wield it to 
entrench themselves or their partisans.126 The Elections Clause, the 
committee recognized, granted Congress “controlling and superseding 
power” over its own elections.127 With that power, Congress could decide 
whether to hold elections by districts or by “general-ticket” (i.e., at-large, 
statewide winner-take-all voting) and how to draw the district lines.128 
Congress could even treat some states differently from others.129 The 
special committee found these powers to be “exceedingly dangerous” 
because Congress could create “an artificial arrangement of districts” such 
that a “small minority of the people would elect a majority of the national 
representatives.”130 
Yet the committee equally feared the power the Elections Clause 
granted the states. The Clause, it was argued, permitted “the very 
foundations of the two most important branches of this Government . . . to 
fluctuate with the mutable counsels of twenty-four separate 
Legislatures.”131 This “Constitutional laxity” undermined the “stability of 
the law,” which should have been an “indispensable safeguard.”132 
“[T]emporary factions” might seize state legislatures and use their 
Elections Clause power to entrench themselves or their allies.133 The 
“existing system” was actually “without system” and should be remedied 
to prevent majorities from adopting measures that would “deprive the 
 
123. 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MISCELLANEOUS 218 (Walter Lowrie & Walter S. Franklin eds., 
1834). 
124. Id. at 218–19. 
125. 41 ANNALS OF CONG. 850–66 (1823). 
126. Id. at 850–53. 
127. Id. at 852. 
128. Id. at 853. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. at 852–53 
131. Id. at 852. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. 
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minority of their just rights,” which was “one of the primary objects of a 
written Constitution.”134 
Notwithstanding these concerns, Congress rejected the proposed 
amendments and left the body’s vast powers as it found them. 
3. Contested Elections (1789–1841) 
Though Congress did not legislate pursuant to the Elections Clause 
during its first fifty years, contested House elections gave lawmakers 
occasion to reflect on the scope of their election powers. 
For example, in 1804, after Representative William Hoge vacated his 
congressional seat, his brother John Hoge was sent to Congress in a 
special election held at the direction of Pennsylvania’s governor.135 
Pennsylvania lacked legislation pertaining to special elections in the event 
of a vacancy. The scenario presented Congress with occasion to consider 
how the Elections Clause interacts with Article I, Section 2, Clause 4, 
which directs the state executive to issue a writ of elections to fill a 
congressional vacancy.136 Representative William Findley (Pa.), who 
chaired the Committee of Elections, acknowledged that Congress could 
regulate the times, place, and manner of holding an election for 
congressional vacancy, even if that election was ultimately called by the 
governor.137 John Lucas, also of Pennsylvania, noted that state lawmakers 
were vested with the power to regulate elections, but added that this is “a 
subject of such importance that Congress is empowered to control the 
State Legislatures in that very case.”138 Three years later, when the House 
seated a member even though his election defied a state statute requiring 
that he reside in one subsection of his district, the House reasserted this 
power. “The Federal Constitution indeed provisionally delegates to the 
State Legislature the authority of directing the time, place, and manner of 
holding elections at the discretion of Congress,” Findley explained.139 
Although Findley thought that Congress should not exercise its Elections 
Clause power except to check “abuses or usurpations of power by the 
States,” he readily conceded that the national legislature “may do [so] at 
discretion.”140 Similar endorsements of Congress’s supreme, 
 
134. Id. 
135. 14 ANNALS OF CONG. 838 (1804). 
136. Article I, Section 2, Clause 4 provides: “When vacancies happen in the Representation from 
any State, the Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such Vacancies.” U.S. 
CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 4. 
137. 14 ANNALS OF CONG. 842–44 (1804). 
138. Id. at 852.  
139. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 874 (1807) (emphasis added). 
140. Id. 
Sweren-Becker & Waldman (Do Not Delete) 10/11/2021  4:05 PM 
1022 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96:997 
 
discretionary power permeate the record of contested House elections 
throughout these decades.141 
Congressional debates in this era reflected not only the supremacy of 
Congress’s elections power, but also the variety of legitimate interests that 
the Elections Clause countenanced. At a minimum, Congress could 
legislate in order to preserve its existence.142 Others recognized additional 
interests, particularly uniformity and the protection of the right of 
qualified electors to vote in congressional elections.143 Congress’s power 
to regulate the “manner” of elections included regulation of balloting, 
counting, election administration, and districting. For example, one 
representative noted without dispute that the term encompassed whether 
“the election may be viva voce, by ballot, by districts for the convenience 
of the voters, or by the States in a general ticket.”144 In 1834, Aaron 
Vanderpoel, a New York Representative and member of the House 
Committee on Elections, explained that the “manner” of holding elections 
included “the means, the judges, the instruments, by which the election is 
to be carried into effect,” along with “the sheriff of the county, and a clerk 
and two judges, appointed by the county court at their term next preceding 
the election.”145 These collectively formed “[t]he conduits through which 
the will of the voter is to flow . . . .”146 Nevertheless, some legislators 
pointed to the limits of the “manner” authority, noting that the 
qualifications of voters and representatives went beyond such power.147 
 
141. See, e.g., 10 CONG. DEB. 4303 (1834) (statement of Rep. Patrick H. Pope, Ky.) (“[T]he right 
to vote for members of this House is derived, not from the constitution of Kentucky, but from the 
constitution of the United States. . . . [T]hat instrument gives to the Legislature, and not to the 
constitution, or those who framed it, the right to prescribe the time, place, and manner of voting . . . so 
long as the Congress shall permit it.”) (emphasis added); 14 CONG. DEB. 1186–87 (1837) (statement 
of Rep. Hugh S. Legaré, S.C.) (Congress “controlled absolutely the whole subject of congressional 
elections, with the single exception of the place of electing Senators”). 
142. See CONG. GLOBE, 25th Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 68 (1838) (statement of Rep. Charles Eaton 
Haynes, Ga.); CONG. GLOBE, 26th Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 12–13 (1840) (statement of Rep. Robert 
Rhett, S.C.). 
143. See CONG. GLOBE, 25th Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 91–92 (1837) (statement of Rep. George W. 
Towns, Ga.). 
144. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 912–13 (1807) (statement of Rep. Philip B. Key, Md.); see also 14 
CONG. DEB. 1187 (1837) (statement of Rep. Hugh S. Legaré, S.C.) (noting that when discussing an 
1837 election dispute, another representative offered a nonexhaustive list of Congress’s “manner” 
authority, which included the power to “pass uniform laws requiring all elections to be by ballot or 
viva voce—all to be by general ticket or by district—all to be at the same season of the year, &c.”). 
145. 10 CONG. DEB. 4286–87 (1834). 
146. Id. at 4287. 
147. See, e.g., 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 908 (1807) (statement of Rep. Josiah Quincy, Mass.) 
(explaining that Congress had exclusive power to establish the qualifications of its members through 
the Qualifications Clause, Article I, Section 5, Clause 1, and that states were not granted such power 
by the Elections Clause); 10 CONG. DEB. 4303 (1834) (statement of Rep. Patrick H. Pope, Ky.). 
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B. The Apportionment Act of 1842 and its Aftermath 
In its first exercise of its power under the Elections Clause, Congress 
enacted an Apportionment Act in 1842,148 requiring that House members 
be elected from contiguous single-member districts.149 The Act also 
reduced the size of the House of Representatives by increasing the ratio 
of persons per representative.150 The fact that Congress had never before 
enacted any Elections Clause legislation loomed over the debate.151 With 
a slight Whig majority in the Twenty-Seventh Congress, it passed the 
House by just two votes, along mostly partisan lines.152 
Coming a half-century after the ratification of the Constitution, it was 
also a chance for the young nation to reflect on the original intent of the 
document. Madison’s Notes on the Debates in the Federal Convention 
were first published in 1840, and Elliot’s Debates—a compilation from 
the state ratifying conventions—came out between 1827 to 1830.153 
Members had a novel opportunity to ground their arguments in the 
Framers’ original intent. As one scholar has noted, “perhaps the most 
striking feature of the debate was the backward-looking tone and structure 
of the argument.”154 
At the time, ten states used at large voting for House elections. Since 
the first Congress, in fact, nearly one-third of members had been elected 
that way.155 This magnified the power of small states, which for decades 
successfully resisted a requirement for districts.156 Whigs believed the 
districting legislation would help preserve their new majority and were 
angered by Alabama’s switch to an at-large ticket in 1840, which deprived 
the state of Whig representation.157 But partisanship was not the only 
 
148. Apportionment Act of 1842, ch. 47, 5 Stat. 491. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. 
151. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 316 (1842) (statement of Rep. Andrew 
Kennedy, D-Ind.) (“[H]ere is a proposition to commence the exercise of a power by this Government, 
which, if it possess the power at all, it is admitted has never been exercised, but has lain dormant for 
the entire period of our national existence.”); id. at 342 (statement of Rep. George S. Houston, D-
Ala.). 
152. Martin H. Quitt, Congressional (Partisan) Constitutionalism: The Apportionment Act Debates 
of 1842 and 1844, 28 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 627, 637 (2008). 
153. Id. at 639–40. 
154. Johanna Nicol Shields, Whigs Reform the “Bear Garden”: Representation and the 
Apportionment Act of 1842, 5 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 355, 372–73 (1985). 
155. ROSEMARIE ZAGARRI, THE POLITICS OF SIZE: REPRESENTATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 
1776–1850, at 129 (1987). 
156. Id. 
157. Shields, supra note 154, at 371; James Thomas Tucker, Redefining American Democracy: Do 
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factor at play. The politics of slavery also led Southerners (including 
Southern Democrats) to support the Bill, because elections held by district 
decreased the likelihood that northern districts would elect critics of 
slavery.158 One South Carolina Democrat warned, “On all the questions 
peculiar to Southern interests, the Northern States, owing to the district 
system, were now divided,” but if “the general [system] prevail[ed], [the 
Northern states] would overwhelm the South.”159 Reducing the size of the 
House by increasing the ratio of persons to representatives also favored 
the less populous Southern states.160 
The Bill’s enactment (despite sharply polarized debate), the next 
Congress’s decision not to repudiate it as unconstitutional, and successive 
districting legislation confirmed that Congress understood it had the 
power to regulate congressional elections and the drawing of districts. 
1. Elections Clause Issues Raised by the Apportionment Act 
Controversy centered on the Apportionment Act’s second section, 
which required single-member congressional districts: “[I]n every case 
where a State is entitled to more than one Representative, the number to 
which each State shall be entitled under this apportionment shall be 
elected by districts composed of contiguous territory equal in number to 
the number of Representatives to which said State may be entitled, no one 
district electing more than one Representative.”161 States would be barred 
from holding at-large elections, or from electing multiple members from 
the same district. 
a. Federalism 
Some Apportionment Act opponents tried to resurrect a familiar 
objection: Congress must defer to states unless they refuse or fail to act 
themselves. “[I]t would be unconstitutional to exercise this power now,” 
Representative John G. Floyd (D-NY) told the House, “because the 
debates in the National Convention prove that it was only intended to be 
an ultimate power, for self-preservation, in case the States neglected to 
 
Alternative Voting Systems Capture the True Meaning of “Representation”?, 7 MICH. J. RACE & L. 
357, 375 (2002).  
158. James A. Gardner, Foreword: Representation Without Party: Lessons from State 
Constitutional Attempts to Control Gerrymandering, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 881, 913 n.114 (2006); 
ZAGARRI, supra note 155, at 140; see, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 448 (1842) (statement 
of Rep. Garret Davis, W-Ky) (“The peculiar principles of the South, and every interest it cherished, 
were to be protected by the district system.”). 
159. CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 445 (1842) (statement of Rep. John Campbell, D-S.C.). 
160. Shields, supra note 154, at 371. 
161. Apportionment Act of 1842, ch. 47, 5 Stat. 491. 
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exercise it.”162 The Senate heard similar arguments. “[I]t was only 
intended that Congress should exercise it in case the States should make 
insufficient regulations, or fail to make them altogether,” one opponent 
insisted.163 
The Act’s supporters countered that the text expressly empowered 
Congress to “alter” state laws for congressional elections at any time. 
“[W]hat plain, unsophisticated man, reading this clause, would for a 
moment doubt the power of Congress to control the whole subject, 
whenever, in its discretion, it shall see fit to do so? Could language be 
more direct, full, and explicit?” asked Representative Sampson H. Butler 
(D-S.C.).164 “Nor is it only in case of a neglect or failure, for any cause, to 
perform this duty, that it then devolves upon Congress,” Representative 
Daniel Barnard (W-N.Y.) argued. “To Congress, moreover, the power is 
ultimate and appellate. If the States fail altogether, or if any one of them 
fail, Congress must act. If the States act, Congress has a right to review, 
and revise, and, if need be, correct and ‘alter’ the regulations which they 
may adopt.”165 Others echoed this interpretation,166 and contested rival 
claims about the Framers’ intent.167 
Each side acknowledged that Congress could not order the states to 
enact particular laws. “Congress may itself make the alterations,” one 
lawmaker complained, “but may not, cannot, direct the Legislatures of the 
States to make them.”168 Similar statements recurred throughout the 
debates.169 Even the Bill’s advocates, such as Senator Nathanial P. 
Tallmadge (W-N.Y.), conceded: “no one on this side of the question has 
said anything about a mandamus or a mandate to the States. No one 
pretends that Congress or this Government has any power to issue such a 
 
162. CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. app. 322 (1842) (emphasis in original). 
163. Id. at 786; see also id. at 584; id. at 524 (statement of Sen. Samuel McRoberts, D-Ill.) (“[T]his 
power was not to be exercised by Congress,” another asserted, “except when the Legislatures of any 
State shall neglect, refuse, or be disabled by invasion, or rebellion, to prescribe the same.”) (emphasis 
in original). 
164. Id. at 319. 
165. Id. at 380. 
166. See, e.g., id. at 490 (statement of Sen. Jabez W. Huntington, W-Conn.); id. at 512 (statement 
of Sen. Nathaniel P. Tallmadge, W-N.Y.); id. at 793 (statement of Sen. Isaac C. Bates, W-Mass.); id. 
at 789 (statement of Sen. Jacob W. Miller, W-Mass.). 
167. Id. at 380 (statement of Rep. Daniel D. Barnard, W-N.Y.); see also id. at 408 (statement of 
Rep. Nathaniel G. Pendleton, W-Ohio); id. at 789 (statement of Sen. Jacob W. Miller, W-Mass.). 
168. Id. at 467 (statement of Sen. Silas Wright, D-N.Y.) (emphasis in original). 
169. See also id. at 360 (statement of Rep. William W. Payne, D-Ala.) (“I do deny that Congress 
has power to command a State Legislature to district a State.”); id. at 449 (statement of Sen. James 
Buchanan, D-Pa.) (“That no such command can be constitutionally issued, I consider to be a clear, 
nay, an almost self-evident proposition.”); id. at 397 (statement of Rep. Charles G. Atherton, D-N.H.); 
id. at 422 (statement of Sen. Leonard Wilcox, D-N.H.). 
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mandate . . . Congress has no such power, and will not attempt to compel 
the States.”170 
The Act’s opponents saw partial election laws as a violation of what 
would later be called the anti-commandeering principle.171 One senator 
insisted: “If they are required to elect by districts, Congress must go on 
and prescribe the boundaries of the districts.”172 Senator Silas Wright (D-
N.Y.), one of the bill’s most dedicated opponents, added that “The great 
principle . . . was, that whatever regulations Congress should attempt to 
make in this matter, should be so made that the people might be able to 
act under them, without the intervention and aid of laws to be passed by 
the State Legislatures.”173 
The Act’s defenders insisted that Congress could exercise as much or 
as little of its Elections Clause power as it saw fit. Any command to the 
states came from the Constitution, not from Congress. “[T]he power of 
Congress and the duty of the States, in relation to this subject, are 
correlative,” Tallmadge explained.174 “Whenever Congress exercises its 
power, the States must perform their duty . . . The extent to which 
Congress will go in making or altering these regulations, whether in whole 
or in part, is entirely within its own discretion.”175 Partial legislation left 
the states free “to fill up the measure of legislation which the case 
requires.”176 Senator Isaac C. Bates (W-Mass.) explained, “[t]here is not 
only no command in [this bill], which seems so offensive to some 
Senators; but there is nothing in the form of a command, nor in effect a 
command.”177 
With the enactment of the Apportionment Act, the understanding that 
the Elections Clause allowed Congress to control some of the “manner” 
of elections without having to control all of it prevailed. 
b. The Meaning of “Manner” 
Although the precise scope of “manner” remained contested, the 
Apportionment Act’s passage confirmed that Congress understood the 
term to include a broad array of topics, including districting. Senator 
 
170. Id. at 512. 
171. Under the “anti-commandeering” doctrine, Congress cannot directly compel states or state 
officials to enforce federal law. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 924 (1997). 
172. CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. app. 524 (1842) (statement of Sen. McRoberts). 
173. Id. at 469. 
174. Id. at 512. 
175. Id.; see also id. at 513; id. at 793 (statement of Sen. Bates). 
176. Id. at 380 (statement of Rep. Barnard). 
177. Id. at 793. 
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Wright acknowledged that “manner” included “the manner of voting, the 
manner of receiving, keeping, counting, and returning the votes, and the 
districts of territory within which the freemen should meet and vote at the 
same poll.”178 Representative William W. Payne (D-Ala.) argued that 
“manner” meant 
[n]othing more than that Congress might, by law, provide that the 
electors should vote viva voce, or by ticket; that the United States 
marshal, the sheriff of a county, commissioners of roads and 
revenue, the county judge, or other officer appointed by Congress, 
should open the polls, receive and count the votes, declare the 
result, and issue the certificate of election, 
before paradoxically adding, “&c. [et cetera], and nothing more.”179 
Representative Walter Colquitt, a newly minted Democrat from Georgia, 
construed districting as a de facto regulation of the qualifications of 
representatives and voters, and argued this went beyond Congress’s 
“manner” authority.180 
Supporters offered similar lists, but often added districting. Tallmadge 
explained that “[t]he manner includes the districts; the voting by ballot or 
viva voce; the officers to conduct the election; the form of the ballot, 
whether written or printed; the ballot boxes; the poll lists; the returns, and 
all the incidents from the commencement to the close of an election.”181 
In a sign of how hard it was to deny that “manner” included districting, 
the Act’s opponents were divided about how (or even whether) to contest 
that claim. Buchanan, who criticized the bill for commandeering state 
legislatures, “freely admit[ted] the power of Congress to divide the States 
into single congressional districts” as one “expressly given to them by the 
terms of the Constitution itself.”182 Though he and opponents of the 
Apportionment Act “might complain of such an act as an abuse of power, 
we could never contend that it was a violation of the Constitution.”183 One 
Representative told his colleagues that he could not justify his claim that 
“manner” excluded districting.184 A smaller number of the Act’s critics 
 
178. Id. at 469. 
179. Id. at 361. 
180. Id. at 447. 
181. Id. at 513; see also id. at 492 (statement of Sen. Huntington) (“The ‘manner’ of holding 
elections embraces several things: such, among others, as an election by districts or general ticket; 
viva voce or by ballot; by a plurality or by a majority”). 
182. Id. at 449. 
183. Id. at 451. 
184. Id. at 360 (“The weight of authority is against me,” he confessed, “but I am not lawyer enough 
to have my thoughts trammeled by precedent, or my mind swayed by authority.”). 
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offered more confident (if not more convincing) objections.185 But none 
of these members won many colleagues to these positions. 
The clear (and ultimately successful) majority of the Twenty-Seventh 
Congress interpreted the “manner of holding elections” to include 
districting.186 Like other supporters of the Act, Tallmadge emphasized the 
original public meaning of the Elections Clause and the intent of the 
Framers more generally. Congress’s power to direct that representatives 
be elected by district was “fully and beyond all question,” Tallmadge 
argued, because of 
the contemporaneous exposition given by [the Framers] and those 
associated with them, in the journal of the convention which 
formed the Constitution—in the publications that enforced its 
adoption—in the debates of the conventions of the States which 
ratified it—and in the proceedings of the first Congress which 
assembled under it.187 
Representative Nathaniel G. Pendleton (W-Ohio) reasoned that if the 
Elections Clause gave the states the power to elect their representatives 
by single-member districts, so too must the Elections Clause give 
Congress the same power.188 
Supporters of the Apportionment Act also advanced the understanding 
of the Elections Clause that would prevail by Reconstruction: that the 
Clause conferred plenary power over congressional elections except as to 
the matters the Constitution seemed to expressly preclude (e.g., the site of 
elections to the Senate and the qualifications of voters and candidates).189 
Affirmations that the phrase “times, places, and manner of holding 
elections” confers plenary power appear throughout these debates.190 
 
185. Senator Arthur P. Bagby (D-Ala.) claimed that the Constitution required at-large 
congressional elections, arguing that single-member districts denied each voter the right to vote for 
all of his state’s House members. Id. at 786. Representative Andrew Kennedy (D-Ind.) suggested that 
the “manner of holding the elections” meant “prescribing the mode in which the voter shall exercise 
the right of suffrage,” a definition he thought denied Congress the power to “break into our territorial 
limits, and there ‘gerrymander’ our States.” Id. at 317. 
186. See, e.g., id. at 512 (statement of Sen. Tallmadge) (“Congress has the power to direct that 
Representatives to the other House be elected by single districts.”). 
187. Id. 
188. Id. at 408. 
189. Id. at 512 (statement of Sen. Tallmadge) (arguing the Elections Clause “includes every thing 
necessary to ascertain, under our system of Republican Government, the popular will in regard to 
those who shall represent them.”). 
190. See, e.g., id. at 789 (statement of Sen. Miller) (“The exercise of the power by Congress . . . is 
a primary overruling power, embracing the whole subject.”); id. at 490 (statement of Sen. Huntington) 
(Congress’s power “[i]s ample, full, and plenary; and, so far as it is exercised, it is supreme, overriding 
State legislation, and is the paramount law, to be obeyed and enforced.”); id. at 319 (statement of Rep. 
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Representatives read the constitutional and ratification conventions, 
together with the history of rejected constitutional amendments, to 
confirm their claims. For example, Senator Jabez Huntington explained: 
The foregoing views are sustained by the opinions expressed in 
the National and State conventions, by all who spoke on the 
subject, and by the resolutions of several of the State conventions, 
which admitted that full power was given, but expressed an ardent 
desire that the Constitution might be so amended as that this 
power should not be exercised except in cases of necessity. All 
the debates and proceedings connected with this subject show the 
entire concurrence of all the friends and all the opponents of the 
Constitution in the opinion that the power of Congress was entire 
and supreme.191 
Pendleton explained that “General Hamilton . . . had no such doubts” 
about whether “the words ‘manner of holding’ . . . can be made to extend 
to the question whether the elections shall be by districts or by general 
ticket.” Indeed, Hamilton “treated the authority of the Legislature, 
whether National or State, as covering the whole ground, embracing all 
the regulations necessary to the consummation of an election, except such 
as are established by the Constitution.”192 
c. Legitimate Congressional Interests 
Debate on the 1842 Apportionment Act also addressed the ends to 
which Congress could legitimately exercise its Elections Clause power. 
i. Self-Preservation 
The least controversial interest that Congress could advance under the 
Elections Clause was one familiar from the Framing: ensuring that 
congressional elections would take place. As “a legal and moral person,” 
Congress necessarily had the power “of continuing and perpetuating its 
own existence, by the due election and perpetuation of these officers,” one 
representative explained.193 Opponents of the Act went further, arguing 
that self-preservation was the only permissible basis for the exercise of 
this federal power. “The power to prescribe the ‘times, places, and 
manner’ of electing Senators and Representatives, was conferred on this 
 
Butler) (“Now, sir, what plain, unsophisticated man, reading this clause, would for a moment doubt 
the power of Congress to control the whole subject . . .? Could language be more direct, full, and 
explicit?”). 
191. Id. at 491. 
192. Id. at 407–08. 
193. Id. at 379 (statement of Rep. Barnard). 
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Government for the sole purpose of enabling it to preserve its own 
existence, provided the States should fail or refuse to elect 
Representatives, and for no other,” Representative Payne asserted in 
typical remarks.194 Over the course of the debate, most of the Act’s critics 
raised some version of this point.195 
Some of the Act’s advocates replied that even if the Framers had 
adopted the Elections Clause to enable Congress to protect itself, the 
Framers had nevertheless written a sweeping grant of general power over 
congressional elections that should be interpreted broadly. For example, 
in response to a critic arguing Congress could not exercise its Elections 
Clause power “until it is indispensable to prevent a dissolution of the 
Government,” Pendleton took a “much larger and more liberal, and [he] 
believe[d] more accurate, view of what the Convention intended by the 
preservation of the Government.”196 Pendleton argued that the Elections 
Clause must be understood broadly to ensure “the purity of popular 
representation in this House, according to the true principles of the 
Constitution[.]”197 He urged the embrace of substance over form. 
Preservation of the federal government would be meaningless if “the 
show, the appearance, the form of our Government” was maintained “but 
the spirit and life are gone” because “the Government is almost as much 
dissolved by a vicious representation as by no representation.”198 Senator 
Bates likewise encouraged his chamber to take a broad view of the 
permissible purposes of the Elections Clause power, arguing that “a 
particular inducement to a grant is not a limitation upon the grant.”199 
ii. Uniformity and Equality 
Representatives also acknowledged that Congress could exercise its 
Elections Clause power to ensure uniformity and equality among districts. 
According to Representative Barnard, “[t]he power conferred on 
Congress by the Constitution, on the subject of the elections, was designed 
to be exercised in either of two events”: if the states did not provide for 
congressional elections or “if these regulations in the different States 
should be such as to produce a want of uniformity and an inequality in the 
 
194. Id. at 361. 
195. See id. at 397 (statement of Rep. Atherton); id. at 465 (statement of Sen. Wright); id. at 786 
(statement of Sen. Bagby); id. at 450–51 (statement of Sen. Buchanan); id. at 322 (statement of Rep. 
Floyd). 
196. Id. at 407. 
197. Id. 
198. Id. 
199. Id. at 793. 
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representation on this floor.”200 Many others agreed.201 As Senator 
Huntington explained, Congress could require that its members be elected 
by district because it would ensure “the right of the people to a free, equal, 
and just representation in the Legislature” and it would “establish a system 
uniform, practicable, just, [and] equal—giving to every portion of the 
people its fair and legitimate political influence.”202 Huntington added that 
such a system would ensure the representativeness of the body by 
“send[ing] up to the House of Representatives men identified in feeling 
and interest with those whom they represent.”203 Even some opponents 
embraced the principle of equal representation. Buchanan, for example, 
called it “the beau ideal of a system of representation.”204 Buchanan 
acknowledged that “[a]s the people of the respective congressional 
districts enjoy equal rights, their Representatives ought to meet and 
deliberate on terms of perfect equality; and they ought individually to be 
subjected to an equal responsibility to those by whom they were 
elected.”205 And chief foe Senator Wright conceded that Congress had the 
power to “alter” state election regulations: 
[b]ecause the Legislature of a State, from disaffected feeling, or 
other cause, might make regulations subversive of the principle, 
of fair and equal representation, impracticable as to time, 
unreasonable as to place, odious as to manner, or otherwise 
subversive of those popular rights intended to be secured by the 
Constitution—and by this provision, as a most essential part of 
it.206 
iii. Protecting Political Minorities 
Protecting political (i.e., partisan) minorities emerged as an important 
congressional interest during these debates. One refrain of advocates for 
single-member districting was that at-large elections denied political 
minorities proportional (or, sometimes, any) representation. This denial 
 
200. Id. at 381. 
201. See id. at 491 (Sen. Huntington, arguing that one aim of the Elections Clause was “to produce 
uniformity in the manner of holding elections, so far as Congress should deem it proper to have the 
manner uniform”); id. at 788 (statement of Sen. Miller); id. at 792 (statement of Sen. Bates). Only in 
the years after this debate would Congress enact legislation to enable uniform administration of 
federal elections. See, e.g., Act of Jan. 23, 1845, ch. 1, 5 Stat. 721 (1845) (uniform presidential 
election day); Act of Feb. 19, 1851, ch. 11, 9 Stat. 568 (1851) (uniform process for resolving contested 
House elections). 
202. CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. app. 493 (1842). 
203. Id. 
204. Id. at 439. 
205. Id. 
206. Id. at 465. 
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of due representation, they contended, amounted to the 
disenfranchisement of political minorities and the entrenchment of 
majorities. The Elections Clause gave Congress the power to right that 
wrong. 
Many in Congress were confident that political minorities had rights 
that Congress had the duty and power to secure. “It needs no argument to 
prove the importance of minorities to the preservation of public liberty, 
and the equitable administration of Government,” Huntington said. “They 
have rights too, which ought to be protected.”207 Chief among these was 
the right to vote and be represented. “If the general-ticket system be 
adopted, that political party which is in a minority, however near it may 
approximate to an equality in numbers, will virtually be disfranchised,” 
Senator Huntington elaborated, “and a free and equal representation of the 
people be prevented.”208 Senator Bates echoed that concern. “The general-
ticket system disfranchises the minority in a State,” he declared, and “may 
be used by the majority to perpetuate their power.”209 “[M]inorities, as 
well as majorities, shall be represented in the Legislature,” another 
explained. “Majorities certainly must govern, but minorities must be 
heard.”210 For many members, single-member districting seemed likely to 
mitigate, if not eliminate, the threat of the tyranny of the majority.211 
In response, the Act’s opponents waved off concerns about such a 
threat and defended a narrower conception of the right to vote as the right 
(of qualified voters) to cast a ballot and have it counted. Senator Leonard 
Wilcox (D-N.H.), for example, predicted that House of “nearly or mainly 
of the same party character” was not “an event to be apprehended or 
expected” because “[i]f it should ever exist, it would break down the party 
by its own cumbrous weight.”212 Senator Bagby argued that denying 
political minorities representation did not deny the right to vote at all: 
“While the right to vote according to the dictates of conscience and 
judgment remains unfettered and uncontrolled, no man is disfranchised. It 
is said, however, that it is destructive of the rights of minorities. Beyond 
the ballot-box minorities have no rights.”213 In enacting the 
Apportionment Act, Congress repudiated this claim that merely casting a 
ballot is all that the right to vote guarantees. 
 
207. Id. at 493. 
208. Id. 
209. Id. at 793–94. 
210. Id. at 409 (statement of Rep. Pendleton). 
211. See id. at 493 (statement of Sen. Huntington); id. at 391 (statement of Sen. John J. Crittenden, 
Ky.); id. at 320 (statement of Rep. Butler). 
212. Id. at 424. 
213. Id. at 584. 
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iv. Preventing Partisan Manipulation 
Finally, and intertwined with the protection of political minorities, the 
Apportionment Act debate reflected that Congress understood the 
Elections Clause to enable it to combat partisan manipulation of election 
law—especially gerrymandering. State power to regulate federal 
elections, one member observed, led to “a violent struggle for the 
ascendancy in the State Legislatures, growing out of the knowledge that 
this power may, and the apprehension that it will, be abused.”214 Partisan 
conflict, in turn, would lead to the reality (or at least the appearance) that 
the minority “had in some way been defrauded of their electoral rights.”215 
“The mode of forming districts, which has received the name of 
gerrymandering . . . which is alike subversive of popular rights and of the 
spirit of the Constitution,” was one particularly threatening means by 
which partisan interests could suppress minority representation.216 
Through the Elections Clause, Congress could decide for itself how its 
elections would proceed, reducing the stakes of state political strife and 
ensuring that “[a]ll attempts to arrange districts for political, party, or 
selfish purposes, would be in vain, and the people would be secure in their 
right to be represented in Congress.”217 
2. Enactment and Aftermath 
The first complete draft of the Apportionment Act passed the House 
with the single-member districting requirement by a vote of 113–87.218 
The House passed the final version of the Bill, embracing two Senate 
amendments to the apportionment ratio, by votes of 113–103 and 111–
102.219 The Senate passed the final Bill by a vote of 25–19.220 
In the years after the enactment of the Apportionment Act of 1842, 
debate about whether the Elections Clause permitted Congress to control 
congressional districting slowly abated. By the close of Reconstruction, 
Congress had enacted two similar districting laws with almost no debate. 
In the first congressional elections under the Apportionment Act of 
1842, four states defied the statute and elected their representatives at-
 
214. Id. at 407 (statement of Rep. Pendleton). 
215. Id. 
216. Id. at 493 (statement of Sen. Huntington); cf. CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 556 (1842) 
(statement of Sen. Wright) (denouncing the “vice” of gerrymandering, which he predicted would be 
the result of districting under the Apportionment Act). 
217. CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. app. 493 (1842) (statement of Sen. Huntington). 
218. CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 471 (1842). 
219. Id. at 649. 
220. Id. at 614. 
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large.221 The outgoing House Committee on Elections recommended a bill 
suspending single-member districting for the upcoming Congress, but it 
was not adopted.222 
When the Twenty-Eighth Congress convened, Democrats had ousted 
the Whig majority. The majority report of the new Congress’s committee 
on the dispute recommended declaring the single-member districting 
provision unconstitutional on anti-commandeering grounds. Because the 
Act could not “execute itself without the intervention of the State 
legislatures” (i.e., unless states drew maps), Congress had commandeered 
the states.223 The report did make a significant concession, however, 
acknowledging that Congress could intervene to protect political rights 
against state laws that threatened them. “If the legislatures of the States 
fail or refuse to act in the premises or act in such a manner as will be 
subversive of the rights of the people and the principles of the 
Constitution,” the report concluded, “then this conservative power 
interposes, and, upon the principle of self-preservation, authorizes 
Congress to do that which the State legislatures ought to have done.”224 
The minority report repeated the constitutional claims that the Act’s 
original supporters had advanced, and concluded that the state laws 
providing for at-large elections were void because Congress had acted 
lawfully in passing the Apportionment Act.225 
After relitigating the constitutional questions discussed in 1842,226 
Congress voted to seat the disputed representatives-elect,227 but also voted 
down a resolution declaring the 1842 law unconstitutional.228 This 
seemingly contradictory position likely reflected politics more than a 
particular view on the Elections Clause. As Franita Tolson, authoritative 
scholar on the Elections Clause and federalism, notes: 
Arguably, the Democrats wanted to impose principled limitations 
on the exercise of federal power to protect the slaveholding states, 
which had been concerned about any broad interpretation of 
federal power, while simultaneously taking advantage of their 
 
221. See CHESTER H. ROWELL, A HISTORICAL AND LEGAL DIGEST OF ALL THE CONTESTED 
ELECTION CASES IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES FROM THE FIRST TO 
THE FIFTY-SIXTH CONGRESS, 1789-1901, at 117–20 (1901). 
222. See id. at 117 n.1; H.R. 649, 27th Cong. (3d Sess. 1843). 
223. See ROWELL, supra note 221, at 119. 
224. See id. at 118; see also Tolson, Congressional Authority, supra note 15, at 352. 
225. See ROWELL, supra note 221, at 120. 
226. See CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 1st Sess. 248–77 (1844). 
227. Id. at 278. 
228. Id. (voting 127 to 57 to substitute a resolution seating the disputed representatives in lieu of 
one that would have declared the Act unconstitutional). 
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majority status by reaffirming the more expansive interpretation 
of federal authority embraced by the Whigs through the 1842 
Act.229 
Subsequent congresses embraced the interpretation of the Elections 
Clause that the Twenty-Seventh Congress had put forward (and rejected 
the narrower view of the Twenty-Eighth Congress). In 1862, Congress 
enacted an Apportionment Act substantially similar to the 1842 statute, 
again requiring that House members be elected from contiguous single-
member districts.230 Debate was desultory.231 In the Apportionment Act of 
1872, Congress again required contiguous single-member districts, and 
further required that each district “contain[] as nearly as practicable an 
equal number of inhabitants.”232 
C. Reconstruction, 1865–1877 
During Reconstruction, congressional activity under the Elections 
Clause centered on two issues. Between 1865 and the ratification of the 
Fifteenth Amendment in 1870, Congress debated whether the Elections 
Clause granted it the power to extend the right to vote to more people—
namely, Black men. Then, having enacted the Fifteenth Amendment, 
Congress enacted three bills to protect the right to vote—constructing the 
first comprehensive system of federal election administration and 
enforcement. The three Enforcement Acts drew on the constitutional 
authority of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, but they also 
relied on the Elections Clause. By the close of this period, Congress 
cemented the understanding that—with the exceptions of voter 
qualifications and the place of choosing Senators—the national legislature 
could exercise plenary power over its own elections. 
1. Congressional Power to Expand the Franchise, 1865–69 
Between 1865 and 1869, Congress debated drafts of what became the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. That debate is as revealing for 
what Congress assumed as for what it rejected. Most notably, although a 
 
229. Tolson, Congressional Authority, supra note 15, at 349. 
230. Apportionment Act, ch. 170, 12 Stat. 572 (1862). 
231. See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 3117–18 (1862) (statement of Sen. Lyman Trumbull, 
R-Ill.) (“This bill reenacts [the 1842 Act], and makes it a permanent law.”); id. (statement of Sen. 
Daniel Clark, R-N.H.) (“After the passage of the old law requiring members to be elected by single 
districts, the State of New Hampshire refused to comply with the law, and elected all her members by 
general ticket, and they were all admitted by the House of Representatives. I thought the precedent 
wrong at the time.”). 
232. Apportionment Act, ch. 11, 17 Stat. 28 (1872). 
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few prominent members of each house contended that the Elections 
Clause granted Congress the power to specify the qualifications of federal 
voters, i.e., who was eligible to vote, Congress largely declined to act on 
that theory. 
Congress began to consider this question even before the Civil War had 
ended. In 1865, New York’s legislature formally requested that the Senate 
adopt 
a law making uniform regulation throughout the United States of 
the times, places, and manner of holding elections for Senators 
and Representatives, except as to the place of choosing Senators, 
defining the qualifications requisite for electors, and abrogating 
such regulations prescribed by the Legislatures in each State or 
otherwise as may be inconsistent therewith . . . .233 
The Senate referred the request to the Committee on the Judiciary,234 
which later decided not to act.235 
Debate on federal legislation to expand the franchise—primarily to 
prohibit denial of the right to vote on the basis of race, color, or previous 
condition of servitude—unfolded in earnest after the war concluded. In an 
1866 debate about a bill to prohibit denial of the right to vote “on account 
of color,” Representative William D. Kelley (R-Penn.) advanced what 
appears to be the first postwar congressional argument that the Elections 
Clause (read in conjunction with the Guarantee Clause) granted Congress 
the power to decide who could vote: 
[The Framers] made it the duty of the United States Government 
to guaranty to each State a republican form of Government, and 
having done that they did not fail to provide the means by which 
the Government on which they had laid that duty should be able 
to perform it. And they gave Congress the amplest power to 
execute that section . . . in section four, article one . . . . Now, sir, 
what did they mean by that provision? . . . Mr. Madison 
said . . . “Should the people of any State by any means be deprived 
of the right of suffrage, it was judged proper that it should be 
remedied by the General Government.”236 
Remarking on the injustice of denying the right to vote to the “educated, 
industrious, taxpaying, school-sustaining, church-building people of this 
District[,]” Kelly exclaimed: “How bitterly would Madison, 
unimpassioned as he was, have denounced such treachery to the essential 
 
233. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 849 (1865). 
234. Id. at 849. 
235. Id. at 977. 
236. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 182–83 (1866) (emphasis in original). 
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principle of republicanism—universal suffrage.”237 As Kelley understood 
the ratification debates, the word “manner” was universally 
acknowledged to include who could vote. “[T]he whole country, so early 
as the 9th of August, 1787, two years before the final adoption of the 
Constitution, were informed that that word [‘manner’] in the clause in 
question embraced not merely the method of voting, the place of voting, 
and the order of voting,” he contended, “but the grand fundamental 
question of who should vote, and by what power they might be invested 
with the right of suffrage.”238 
Few shared Kelley’s view. “Mr. Speaker, it is utterly impossible, by 
any rules of construction that have ever properly been applied to language, 
to place any such construction as that upon the simple clause in the 
Constitution which has been read,” one representative replied.239 Another 
denounced Kelley’s argument as “one of the most dangerous and startling 
that has yet been suggested in connection with our national policy.”240 
Kelley acknowledged the opposition, but argued that the Elections Clause 
was fundamentally intended to provide for universal suffrage. 
“Gentlemen tell me that this is a new construction of the Constitution,” he 
acknowledged, but “I reply that it is the true one, which is enough for me, 
and that the old and false one was the fruitful source of discord and war 
and misery.”241 
The following year, 1867, Congress did enact one statute expanding 
the franchise, but the body did not clearly identify the constitutional 
source of its power to do so.242 The First Reconstruction Act required the 
former Confederate States to convene constitutional conventions of 
delegates “elected by the male citizens of said State, twenty-one years old 
and upward, of whatever race, color, or previous condition, who have 
been resident in said State for one year previous to the day of such 
election,” and specified that the resulting constitutions “shall provide that 
the elective franchise shall be enjoyed by all such persons as have the 
qualifications herein stated for electors of delegates.”243 The Act directly 
set the qualifications for state voters, and some members sporadically 
invoked the Guarantee Clause.244 
 
237. Id. at 183. 
238. Id. at 409. 
239. Id. at 412 (statement of Rep. Samuel S. Marshall, D-Ill.). 
240. Id. at 454 (statement of Rep. Michael C. Kerr, D-Ind.). 
241. Id. at 409. 
242. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1315–40, 1458–69 (1867) (debating the First 
Reconstruction Act without invoking the Elections Clause). 
243. First Reconstruction Act, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 429 (1867). 
244. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1318–19 (1867). 
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Support for the claim that Congress could decide who could vote in 
federal elections grew in the remaining years before the passage and 
ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment, but no more than a small 
minority of each house understood the Elections Clause that way.245 In the 
Senate, Radical Republican Charles Sumner (Mass.) was the leading 
supporter of congressional power over voter qualifications. 
[T]here are two hostile pretensions which must be exposed; the 
first, founded on a false interpretation of “qualifications,” being 
nothing less than the impossible assumption that because the 
States may determine the “qualifications” of electors, therefore 
they can make color a criterion of the electoral franchise; and the 
second, founded on a false interpretation of the asserted power of 
the States “to regulate suffrage,” being nothing less than the 
impossible assumption that, under the power to regulate suffrage, 
the rights of a whole race may be annihilated. These two 
pretensions are, of course, derived from slavery. They are hatched 
from the eggs that the cuckoo bird has left behind. Strange that 
Senators will hatch them . . . . Admitting that the States may 
determine the “qualifications” of electors; what then? Obviously 
it must be according to the legitimate meaning of this 
word . . . . The Constitution, where we find this word, follows the 
Declaration of Independence and refuses to recognize any 
distinction of color . . . . The “qualifications” of different officers, 
as President, Vice President, Senators and Representatives are 
named; but “color” is not among these . . . . The dictionaries of 
our language are in harmony with the Constitution. Look at 
“qualifications” in Webster or Worcester, the two best authorities 
of our time, and you will find that the word means “fitness”— 
“ability”—“accomplishment”—“the state of being qualified;” but 
it does not mean “color!” It embraces age, residence, character, 
education and the payment of taxes—in short, all those conditions 
which when honestly administered are in the nature of regulation, 
not of disfranchisement . . . . An insurmountable condition is not 
a qualification but a disfranchisement.246 
Because race was not a “qualification,” he argued, then the Elections 
Clause empowered Congress to protect the federal right to vote from this 
unconstitutional restriction. Sumner pointed to Madison’s argument that 
“[s]hould the people of any State by any means be deprived of the right 
 
245. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 173–83, 403–12, 447–60, 1054–62 (1866); CONG. 
GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2053–57, 3023–27 (1868); CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 555–
61, 642–45 (1869). 
246. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 3026 (1868) (emphasis in original). 
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of suffrage, it was judged proper that it should be remedied by the General 
Government.”247 “Thus was it expressly understood, at the adoption of the 
Constitution,” Sumner concluded, “that Congress should have the power 
to prevent any State, under the pretense of regulating the suffrage, from 
depriving the people of this right or from interfering with the principle of 
Equality.”248 
In the House, George Boutwell (R-Mass.) led the charge for the view 
that the Elections Clause was the source of both federal and state power 
over congressional elections. For that reason, any state power over federal 
voter qualifications was subject to Congress’s controlling power to “make 
or alter” state regulations of federal elections. He argued that the Voter 
Qualifications Clause gives neither to the States nor to Congress the 
power to determine the qualification of voters.249 Rather, 
[i]t merely declares the fact that the voters for Representatives in 
Congress shall possess the qualifications of voters for members 
of the most numerous branch of the State Legislature . . . . But 
there is no declaration in this section that either [the States or the 
national Government] has the power, and certainly not that either 
has the power to the exclusion of the other.250 
The Elections Clause explained who “has the power,” and on what 
terms: 
The word “manner,” in this connection of course becomes 
important . . . . It includes, as I maintain, everything relating to an 
election, from the qualification of the elector to the deposit of his 
ballot in the box . . . . Either one or the other of two things is true: 
either these words as herein employed in their scope and meaning 
cover the entire subject of elections, from the qualifications of the 
voter to the deposit of his ballot in the box, or else, by necessary 
legal inference, the States have not the power which they have 
been in the habit of exercising . . . . But the history of the facts 
from the first, and the recognition by Congress of the powers of 
the States, go to the extent of conceding to them entire scope and 
original control of the whole matter of voting, including the 
qualifications of the voter, his registration, and the deposit of his 
ballot in the box . . . . [T]herefore, when a State-rights man proves 
that by the Constitution of the United States a State has a right to 
decide who shall exercise the elective franchise, he has proved 
also that Congress may do the same thing under this provision of 
 
247. Id. at 3027 (emphasis omitted). 
248. Id. (emphasis in original). 
249. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 556 (1869). 
250. Id. 
Sweren-Becker & Waldman (Do Not Delete) 10/11/2021  4:05 PM 
1040 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96:997 
 
the Constitution which says that Congress may make any 
regulations it chooses relating to this subject or may alter such 
regulations as have been made by the States.251  
Like Sumner, Boutwell closed by pointing to the purpose of the Clause at 
the founding—to ensure that Congress could provide a remedy when a 
state deprived people of the right to vote.252 With this authority, Boutwell 
urged, federal law should prohibit denial of the right to vote on the basis 
of race. Gauging support for Sumner’s and Boutwell’s position is difficult, 
but their arguments were not widely taken up by their colleagues. 
Congress chose to amend the Constitution instead. 
2. The Enforcement Acts 
In 1870 and 1871, in the wake of the Civil War, Congress invoked its 
powers under the Elections Clause and the new Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments to enact three Enforcement Acts to protect the right to vote, 
particularly for newly enfranchised Black men.253 The Enforcement Acts 
and the associated debates underscore that Congress understood the 
Elections Clause to confer expansive power over congressional elections 
(the scope of the franchise aside), permitting the federal government to 
establish a comprehensive code for election administration, integrity, and 
security. The debates reveal a Congress focused on securing free, fair, and 
racially inclusive elections by any means deemed necessary and proper, 
and less concerned than its 1842 predecessor with defining the precise 
scope of “manner” or identifying particularized legitimate legislative 
interests. 
a. The First Enforcement Act 
On May 31, 1870, Congress enacted “An Act to enforce the Right of 
Citizens of the United States to vote in the several States of this Union”—
the First Enforcement Act.254 As the title suggests, the Act reached beyond 
the confines of the recently ratified Fifteenth Amendment (which applies 
to voting restrictions on account of race, color, or previous condition of 
servitude) to establish a federal regime for protecting the right to vote. For 
that reason, the Act’s constitutionality rests in large part on the Elections 
 
251. Id. 
252. Id. at 557. 
253. First Enforcement Act, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (1870); Second Enforcement Act, ch. 99, 
16 Stat. 433 (1871); Third Enforcement Act, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871); CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 
2d Sess. 3871–84 (1870); CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. app. 207–14 (1871); CONG. GLOBE, 
41st Cong., 3d Sess. 1271–85, 1633–49 (1871). 
254. 16 Stat. at 140. 
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Clause. 
The First Enforcement Act deployed sweeping federal power over 
congressional elections.255 Congress created new crimes, penalties, and 
civil causes of action against private individuals for interference with the 
right to vote, prohibiting the use of “force, bribery, threats, intimidation, 
or other unlawful means” to “hinder, delay, prevent, or obstruct . . . any 
citizen from doing any act required to be done to qualify him to vote or 
from voting at any [congressional] election,”256 or “to prevent or hinder 
his free exercise and enjoyment of any right or privilege granted or 
secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because 
of his having exercised the same.”257 The Act gave federal district courts 
exclusive jurisdiction over all crimes and offenses committed against the 
provisions of the Act, and it granted to federal district and appellate courts 
concurrent jurisdiction over all other actions arising under the law.258 
The First Enforcement Act also marked an unprecedented exercise of 
federal power over the states and their agents. For example, the statute 
attempted to preempt malfeasance by state actors by deeming that any 
eligible voter who offered or attempted to fulfill a state’s “prerequisite[s]” 
for voting would be entitled to vote if a state officer wrongfully failed to 
receive or permit the performance of the prerequisite.259 In any election 
involving a congressional race, the Act declared it a federal crime for any 
federal or state election officer to “neglect or refuse to perform” the duties 
imposed by any federal or state election law.260 Congress established 
federal protection of, and regulation over, all state voter registration 
systems that served “any State or other election at which such 
representative or delegate in Congress shall be chosen,” even if “the same 
shall also be made for the purposes of any State, territorial, or municipal 
election.”261 To escape federal reach, a state would have to operate a 
completely independent election system for its own elections. Congress 
authorized the military to augment the courts. The Act declared, “it shall 
be lawful for the President of the United States to employ such part of the 
land or naval forces of the United States, or of the militia, as shall be 
necessary to aid in the execution of judicial process issued under this 
 
255. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–1877, at 
454–59 (1988). 
256. First Enforcement Act §§ 4, 5. 
257. Id. § 6. 
258. Id. § 8. 
259. Id. § 3. 
260. Id. § 22. 
261. Id. § 20. 
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act.”262 
Relatively little debate about the Elections Clause preceded the First 
Enforcement Act—seemingly less than the Apportionment Act of 1842. 
Still, some House Democrats raised the familiar objection that the statute 
exceeded congressional authority under the Elections Clause. “Whence 
came the authority of Congress to make penal bribery, intimidation, or 
influence in respect of elections in the States . . . ?” Representative 
Clarkson Potter (D-N.Y.) asked.263 Finding no basis in the Elections 
Clause or the Fifteenth Amendment, Potter argued that many of the Act’s 
provisions “relate neither to the time, place, nor manner of holding 
elections . . . nor to the denial or abridgment of suffrage on account of 
race, color, or previous condition of servitude . . . and in all such respects, 
therefore, this bill is necessarily and flagrantly without authority.”264 
Representative Michael Kerr (D-Ind.) fulminated, “every single section of 
this bill—twenty-three in number—save only the first, involves a palpable 
violation of the spirit and letter of the Constitution.”265 Kerr argued that 
“[i]t was never contemplated by the people that Congress would attempt 
to usurp control of the elections in the States, to dictate in what manner 
they should be conducted, to put them under the supervision of Federal 
officers, and give all judicial power over them to Federal courts”—but he 
made no attempt to reckon with the “manner” authority provided by the 
Elections Clause.266 Another member objected that the bill was “placing 
in the hands of Congress all matters growing out of State elections.”267 
Republicans dismissed these objections. The law’s provisions “are but 
a simple exercise of the power expressly conferred on the Congress of the 
United States to regulate elections of members and Delegates to 
Congress,” Representative John Bingham (R-Ohio), principal author of 
the Fourteenth Amendment and a legal architect of Congressional 
Reconstruction, told his colleagues.268 Bingham explained,  
the sum total of the outcry against this bill is that by it the equal 
rights of the people of this country are to be enforced, for the first 
time in the history of the Republic, by a national statute and by 
the whole power of the Union and of the people of all the States.269  
Representative Noah Davis (R-N.Y.) thundered, “it is true . . . that 
 
262. Id. § 13. 
263. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3876 (1870). 
264. Id. 
265. Id. at 3872. 
266. Id. at 3872–73. 
267. Id. at 3875 (statement of Rep. James B. Beck, D-Ky.). 
268. Id. at 3872. 
269. Id. at 3883. 
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heretofore in the history of this country it has not been necessary for 
Congress to interfere for the purpose of preserving the purity of the 
election of members of this House. But has not that time now arrived?”270 
Amid the white violence and subterfuge prevailing in the former 
Confederate States, “members of this body cannot be elected fairly and 
according to the will of those entitled to exercise the right of suffrage 
unless Congress intervenes and exercises that dormant power that has so 
long existed, but which has never yet been exercised.”271 
Indeed, the debates were studded with lurid claims about how the 
Enforcement Act subjugated white people, particularly when a draft of the 
bill also included measures ending racial discrimination in the taxation 
and treatment of immigrants.272 Opponents chastised the Bill as unfair 
favoritism towards freed slaves. “The bill now before us seeks to give the 
negro rights, safeguards, and remedies which are withheld from the white 
man,” one representative complained with reference to section 5, which 
provided additional protection for the right to vote of anyone “to whom 
the right of suffrage is secured or guaranteed by the fifteenth 
amendment.”273 “[Y]ou cannot with impunity trample upon this great 
white race,” he added, arguing that if Congress “humiliate[d] and 
degrade[d] the white man” by enacting the Enforcement Act, states would 
simply adopt literacy tests (as Massachusetts had) and enfranchise 
immigrants to “increase[]” “the white majority at the polls.”274 In response 
to statements of unabashed white supremacy, Representative Davis 
tersely affirmed that the bill “simply prohibits crime.”275 
The final version of the First Enforcement Act passed the House with 
133 yeas, 58 nays, and 39 members not voting,276 and passed the Senate 
with 48 yeas and 11 nays.277 
 
270. Id. at 3881. 
271. Id. 
272. See, e.g., id. (statement of Rep. John D. Stiles, D-Pa.) (“I protest against this outrage in the 
name of every white voter in this country. . . . I protest against it because I am in favor of a white 
man’s Government upon this continent, and utterly opposed to forcing upon an unwilling people 
negro suffrage, negro equality, and negro supremacy . . . .”); id. at 3877 (statement of Rep. James A. 
Johnson, D-Cal.) (“Mr. Speaker, this bill ought to be entitled an act to foster paganism . . . to foster 
child murder, to strike down Christianity, and to deprive the people of their liberties. Of course nearly 
all of this long conglomeration of vicious verbiage is directed against the white man and in favor of 
the Chinaman.”).  
273. Id. at 3874 (statement of Rep. Beck, D-Ky.). 
274. Id. at 3874–75. 
275. Id. at 3881. 
276. Id. at 3884. 
277. Id. at 3809. 
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b. The Second Enforcement Act 
The following year, Congress enacted the Second Enforcement Act,278 
framed as a set of amendments to its predecessor. The law established a 
new system of federal election administration and supervision. At the 
request of two citizens in any town of at least twenty thousand people, 
each United States circuit judge was required to commission two local 
“supervisors of election” to “guard[] and scrutinize[]” voter registration 
and balloting.279 These federal election supervisors were authorized to 
“personally inspect and scrutinize such registry . . . in such manner as 
will, in their or his judgment, detect and expose the improper or wrongful 
removal therefrom, or addition thereto, in any way, of any name or 
names.”280 They were also authorized to supervise and challenge the 
counting of the votes,281 to maintain clear lines of sight over all election 
processes,282 and to investigate and challenge the seating of any 
representative-elect whose election defied the new regime.283 Congress 
criminalized the obstruction of these supervisors or any other federal 
election administration officials—including the federal marshals and 
deputies tasked with enforcing much of the new election system—and 
undermining the integrity of the voter registration system.284 The Act also 
required the states to conduct congressional elections with paper ballots, 
expressly displacing all state laws that said otherwise: “[A]ll votes for 
representatives in Congress shall hereafter be by written or printed ballot, 
any law of any State to the contrary notwithstanding; and all votes 
received or recorded contrary to the provisions of this section shall be of 
none effect.”285 Finally, the Second Enforcement Act doubled down on 
enforcement. Among other things, Congress empowered the federal 
marshals to enlist the local bystanders to combat violent resistance286 and 
gave the federal courts complete jurisdiction over all matters arising under 
the Enforcement Acts.287 
These additions to the growing federal election system prompted 
vigorous, if far from novel, congressional debate about the meaning of the 
 
278. Second Enforcement Act, ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433 (1871). 
279. Id. § 2. 
280. Id. § 4. 
281. Id. § 5. 
282. Id. § 6. 
283. Id. § 7. 
284. Id. § 10. 
285. Id. § 19. 
286. Id. § 12. 
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Elections Clause. 
Some opponents raised the tired objection that Congress could only 
exercise its Elections Clause power if states defaulted on their duty to 
provide for congressional elections or otherwise threatened the existence 
of Congress.288 Although Kerr argued that Congress could only act under 
very limited circumstances, he conceded that once Congress could act, it 
could set up the very sort of federal election administration system the two 
Enforcement Acts had created.289 In those emergencies,  
Congress may declare that elections shall be held at certain times 
and at certain places and in a certain manner; for example, that 
ballot-boxes shall be opened at each voting precinct . . . , and that 
an election board shall be organized there under Federal laws, and 
in the persons of one inspector and two judges.290 
When another opponent of the Second Enforcement Act, Senator George 
Vickers (D-Md.), rose to make a similar argument that Congress could act 
only for “reasons of absolute, unqualified necessity,” he included among 
those “paramount reasons of State” not only “to perpetuate the existence 
of the Government,” but also “to preserve representation” and “to protect 
minorities by the district system.”291 
Other opponents resurrected the anti-commandeering objection. 
Representative Charles Eldridge, for example, asked indignantly whether 
anyone would argue that under the Elections Clause, or any other 
constitutional provision, “the Governors of the States and all other State 
officers can, under penalties, be required by the Federal Government to 
serve as its officers and do its bidding[.]”292 
Some lawmakers questioned whether the “manner of holding 
elections” included the wide range of regulation imposed by the Second 
Enforcement Act.293 In response, the statute’s supporters, as in previous 
 
288. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 1277 (1871). 
289. Id.  
290. Id. 
291. Id. at 1633. Immediately after it passed, Vickers moved (unsuccessfully) to rename it “An act 
to prevent the free and intelligent voters of the United States from exercising the right of suffrage.” 
Id. at 1655. 
292. Id. at 1272. 
293. See, e.g., id. at app. 208 (“[W]hat is meant by the word ‘manner,’ and with what power does 
this simple word invest Congress? for it is upon this word, and this word only, that this measure is at 
all pretended to be justified. . . . Congress may, under this power, prescribe how the votes shall be 
received for Representatives, whether by ballot or viva voce; how they shall be counted or canvassed, 
how they shall be returned, and how certified; authorize the kind of ballot-boxes to be used, and such 
like things connected with the ‘holding’ of the election. Nothing more could have been 
intended . . . .”); id. at 1637 (“But what right has Congress to interfere with the registration of voters? 
What clause of the Constitution gives them the right? The States have the exclusive power to judge 
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decades, answered that the Clause granted Congress comprehensive 
power to regulate congressional elections. Calling attention to the 
Elections Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, and the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Representative William Lawrence (R-Ohio) contended, 
“Congress could provide officers to conduct the elections of 
Representatives in Congress. Under these provisions Congress may define 
and punish crimes against the exercise of the elective franchise in the 
election of Representatives in Congress.”294 Just as the constitutional 
power to tax permits Congress to criminalize violations of the revenue 
laws, and the constitutional power to establish post offices permits 
congress to define offenses against the postal service, so too “the power 
to make regulations as to the ‘times, places, and manner’ of holding 
elections for Representatives in Congress carries with it the right to define 
penal offenses against the exercise of the elective franchise.”295 
Representative Burton Cook (R-Ill.) likewise argued that the power to 
correct violations of election law was inherent in Congress’s “manner” 
authority: 
if these frauds in the elections grow to any extent out of the 
manner of conducting the elections, then clearly to that extent the 
remedy is within our power, and we are called upon to apply that 
remedy by every consideration that would induce us to preserve 
our free Government and preserve the liberties of our people.296 
Cook emphasized that 
there can be no valid reason urged against the passage of this bill, 
unless it can be shown that under a fair and reasonable 
administration of this act, if it should become a law, men who are 
justly entitled to vote would be deprived of their right to do so.297 
And he pointed out that “[n]o evidence” had been produced to that 
effect.298 
The bill’s proponents argued that the enforcement legislation was 
authorized on even the narrowest traditional grounds: Congress’s need to 
protect itself from subversion by states. In this emergency, nothing less 
than a federal election code could secure Congress’s fundamental interest 
in its own existence and integrity. Bingham stated the case clearly. “Your 
 
of and fix the qualifications of voters; not denying or abridging the right by reason of race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude. The States are to fix the age and residence. The ‘manner’ of 
conducting an election refers to a different subject.”). 
294. Id. at 1276. 
295. Id. 
296. Id. at 1280. 
297. Id. 
298. Id. 
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Constitution would have been only a glittering bauble if it had not 
conferred, as it did confer, upon the national Legislature the power of self-
preservation,” he began.299 “Who does not know that if the State 
Legislature should choose to incumber the exercise of this power with 
inconvenient or impossible conditions, and if the national Congress had 
not the power to overrule or alter such conditions, the nation would 
perish?”300 Others concurred. “The idea that Congress cannot protect the 
national Government in the election of the very officers who are to make 
its laws is supremely ridiculous and absurd,” Lawrence argued.301 “This 
power to preserve the purity of the ballot is simply the exercise of that 
inherent power, which this, like every other Government has—a power 
higher, if possible, than the Constitution—the power of preserving its own 
existence when that existence is threatened by force or fraud . . . .”302 
Lawrence reasoned that no member could deny that such force and fraud 
had already occurred: 
Sir, we all know that Kuklux outrages have been committed, not 
only in North Carolina, where it was recently necessary to call out 
a military force to protect the people at the elections, but in other 
States of the South; and that in more than one city of this Union 
enormous frauds have been perpetrated upon the ballot-box.303 
Even if the legislation was unprecedented, the crisis was unprecedented 
too. “It is said that the last clause of this section [of the Elections Clause] 
giving the power to Congress has fallen into abeyance, never having been 
used, and should now be considered but as a dead letter,” Representative 
Cook said.304 “Sir, the men who framed this Constitution foresaw that the 
exigency might arise, as it has arisen, requiring the exercise of this power 
by Congress, and they provided for its exercise when that exigency should 
arise.”305 
The bill passed the House by a vote of 144 yeas, 64 nays, and 32 
members not voting,306 and the Senate by a vote of 39 yeas to 10 nays.307 
 
299. Id. at 1283. 
300. Id.  
301. Id. at 1276. 
302. Id. 
303. Id. at 1275. 
304. Id. at 1280. 
305. Id. at 1280 (emphasis added). 
306. Id. at 1285. 
307. Id. at 1655. 
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c. The Third Enforcement Act 
Less than two months later, Congress enacted a third Enforcement Act, 
also known as the Ku Klux Klan Act.308 The third Enforcement Act, 
known as “An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for other 
Purposes,” pursued some of its other purposes through the Elections 
Clause.309 Most of the Act’s provisions increased federal military and 
judicial authority over regional violence, but section 2 of the Act also 
created a new civil cause of action against voter intimidation and related 
interference with the right to vote, which remains in the U.S. Code as 
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), and a criminal equivalent, which does not.310 The 
House passed its first version by 118–91,311 and the Senate passed its own 
by a vote of 45–19.312 The House approved the final bill by a vote of 93 
yeas, 74 nays, and 63 not voting,313 and the Senate approved it with 36 
yeas and 13 nays.314 
Because this second section of the Act resembled the sixth section of 
the First Enforcement Act, which created a cause of action against 
conspiracies to violate the rights of federal citizenship, Congress engaged 
in little original constitutional debate. As Representative Samuel 
Shellabarger (R-Ohio) said while making the case for the bill, “it rests 
upon exactly the same legal ground, and is in its constitutional aspects 
identical with [the First Enforcement Act], the only difference being that 
the section of this bill defines the offense with greater exactness.”315 Only 
James Garfield felt the need to mention the Elections Clause as the source 
of constitutional authority for this federal protection of the right to vote, 
and his remarks on this point appear to have been relatively 
uncontroversial. Garfield acknowledged that it had been repeatedly 
argued “that the clause in the main text which gives to Congress the power 
to regulate the time, place, and manner of holding elections carried with 
it the whole question of suffrage. I was never able to believe that this 
clause went so far.”316 But, he continued, “I did believe, and I do now 
believe, that it goes so far that, with the fifteenth amendment superadded, 
 
308. Third Enforcement Act, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871). 
309. Id. 
310. Id. § 2. 
311. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 522 (1871). 
312. Id. at 709. 
313. Id. at 808. 
314. Id. at 831. 
315. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 69 (1871). 
316. Id. at 154. 
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Congress is armed with more than a mere negative power, and had the 
right to pass the enforcement act of May last [i.e., the First Enforcement 
Act].”317 
III. THE ELECTIONS CLAUSE IN FEDERAL COURTS 
A. Reconstruction 
The three Enforcement Acts marked Congress’s first foray into creating 
a federal scheme of election regulations that went beyond districting. At 
the same time, the Acts granted federal courts jurisdiction over matters 
arising under the new laws. It’s no surprise then, that the Enforcement 
Acts offered federal courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, the first 
occasions to opine meaningfully on the Elections Clause and its scope. 
Before Reconstruction, courts typically referred to the Elections Clause 
as a way to understand some other issue or unrelated aspect of law.318 For 
example, in establishing the foundational principle that federal courts 
retain the power to review state court decisions interpreting federal law or 
the Constitution, in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee,319 Justice Story pointed to 
the Elections Clause as an instance in which the Constitution makes 
federal law supreme.320 In interpreting the word “manner” as used in a 
statute providing pensions to widows of the Revolutionary War, the Court 
of Claims explained that the word was so broad as used in the Elections 
Clause to permit Congress to enact the Apportionment Act of 1842 and 
compel elections by district.321 
The Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York appears to 
have been the first federal court to elaborate on the purpose of the 
Elections Clause when the court considered the constitutionality of the 
 
317. Id. 
318. See Tolson, Congressional Authority, supra note 15, at 361 (“Prior to Reconstruction, there 
was not much mention of the Elections Clause in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, much less any 
thorough analysis of the meaning of its terms.”). 
319. 14 U.S. 304 (1816). 
320. Id. at 343; see also Smith v. Turner (Passenger Cases), 48 U.S. 283, 497–98 (1849) (Daniel, 
J., dissenting) (arguing states exercise powers “until they shall be superseded by a paramount 
authority vested in the Federal government,” including those in the Elections Clause). 
321. Smith v. United States, 1857 WL 4176, at *3 (Ct. Cl. Feb. 16, 1857) (“[In 1842 it] was 
considered by Congress that in the word ‘manner’ was included the power to prescribe that 
congressional districts should each be composed of contiguous territory, although in some of the 
States the elections for members of Congress had already been had by general ticket. Whether the 
authority of Congress in this particular has ever been contested or not, this act shows the construction 
given by Congress to the word manner. Now, if the manner of holding an election means that Congress 
may provide that the election of its members shall be by districts composed of contiguous territory, 
the word is surely comprehensive enough in the present case to mean that the pension shall commence 
on the 4th of March, 1848.”). 
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First Enforcement Act less than six months after the law’s passage.322 
Noah Davis was the attorney who argued that the Act (and a criminal 
prosecution thereunder) was constitutional under the Elections Clause.323 
Davis had been a congressman from New York and had vocally defended 
the Act just months earlier.324 President Grant appointed Davis to be the 
U.S. District Attorney (now known as “U.S. Attorney”) for the Southern 
District of New York in July of 1870.325 As the first court to examine the 
underpinnings of the Elections Clause in nearly a century of the 
provision’s existence, United States v. Quinn326 should be foundational to 
understanding the meaning and purpose of the Clause—but it has never 
been cited by the Supreme Court or any other federal court in analyzing 
the scope of the Clause. 
The Quinn Court looked to the intent in drafting and adopting the 
Elections Clause, examining “the explanations which were given by the 
great and good men who expounded it.”327 The court repeatedly 
recognized the singular importance of an accurate and fair vote: 
those framers of the constitution did not, for one moment, lose 
sight of the indispensable condition—on which alone a 
government of the people could be safe to the people themselves 
or could secure the beneficent ends for which it was instituted—
that her popular vote should be the true expression of the opinions 
and choice of the electors.328 
And the court articulated the Framers’ underlying fears that “the states 
might become indifferent to the general good,” and as a result fail to 
hold congressional elections or put obstacles in the way of “the full 
and fair expression of the popular voice.”329 
Each of Congress’s powers under the Elections Clause was, according 
to the Quinn Court, intended to ensure the people could express their voice 
through a fair vote. For example, Congress needed the authority to set the 
time of elections because “[t]ime might some where be so arranged, and 
for some end other than the well-being of the whole nation, that the 
 
322. See United States v. Quinn, 27 F. Cas. 673 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1870) (No. 16,110). 
323. Id. at 676. 
324. See supra notes 270, 271, 275. 
325. Davis, Noah, (1818–1902), BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE U.S. CONG., http://bioguide. 
congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=D000126 [https://perma.cc/WWM5-QAFY]. Davis was a 
personal friend of President Grant’s, according to Davis’s obituary. See Ex-Justice Davis Dead, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 21, 1902), https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1902/03/21/101942952.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WPZ9-6VJU]. 
326. 27 F. Cas. 673 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1870) (No. 16,110). 
327. Id. at 678. 
328. Id. 
329. Id. 
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popular voice might be denied a full expression.”330 Congress likewise 
required superseding power to establish the place of elections because 
“[p]lace might be so fixed as in that mode to defeat the general and the 
indispensable purpose.”331 Lastly, Congress retained authority over the 
manner of conducting elections because “[t]he manner of holding an 
election might be such as to operate to prevent an open, fair expression of 
the popular voice.”332 The Elections Clause was designed to avoid a 
scenario in which “either through an indifference of the states or 
otherwise, that the general government might find itself unsupported by 
the very people in whose will the foundations of the government 
rested.”333 The Quinn Court plainly stated that the “principle on which it 
was declared that this clause might be useful” was that “all legal voters 
should have full and fair opportunity to deposit their votes.”334 
Similarly, where defendants challenged the constitutionality of the law 
under which they were prosecuted for conspiracy to intimidate voters, a 
federal court in Louisiana concluded that the law was “clearly within the 
constitutional power of congress” as granted by the Elections Clause.335 
That provision was “framed to secure the existence of the government 
itself, and was made in the interest of all the people of all the states.”336 
The Elections Clause, along with the Voter Qualifications Clause, was 
“intended to place the election of representatives in the ultimate power of 
congress, so as to secure at all times a house of representatives, first by 
preventing obstructive legislation by the states, and, second, securing to 
the voter the protection of the general government.”337 
The Supreme Court first addressed the constitutionality of the 
Enforcement Acts in 1875, in two decisions issued on the same day—
United States v. Reese338 and United States v. Cruikshank.339 Neither 







335. United States v. Goldman, 25 F. Cas. 1350, 1354 (C.C.D. La. 1878) (No 15,225). 
336. Id. at 1353. 
337. Id. at 1354. 
338. 92 U.S. 214 (1875). 
339. 92 U.S. 542 (1875). 
340. Reese expressly disclaimed application of the Clause because the case involved an election 
for state representatives only. See Reese, 92 U.S. at 218. 
Sweren-Becker & Waldman (Do Not Delete) 10/11/2021  4:05 PM 
1052 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96:997 
 
covered narrowing of the Reconstruction Amendments.341 
Five years later, the Court was confronted with a challenge to other 
provisions of the First and Second Enforcement Acts in the context of a 
federal election. In Ex parte Siebold,342 defendants (some of whom were 
election judges) were charged with stuffing ballot boxes and engaging in 
other acts of interference in and manipulation of a congressional election 
in Maryland.343 The Court upheld several provisions of the First and 
Second Enforcement Acts as expressly authorized by the Elections 
Clause. In so doing, the Court embraced Congress’s broad authority to 
legislate under the Clause and rejected the argument that Congress could 
not enact partial federal regulations: 
After first authorizing the States to prescribe the regulations, it is 
added, ‘The Congress may at any time, by law, make or alter such 
regulations.’ ‘Make or alter:’ What is the plain meaning of these 
words? . . . There is no declaration that the regulations shall be 
made either wholly by the State legislatures or wholly by 
Congress. If Congress does not interfere, of course they may be 
made wholly by the State; but if it chooses to interfere, there is 
nothing in the words to prevent its doing so, either wholly or 
partially. On the contrary, their necessary implication is that it 
may do either. It may either make the regulations, or it may alter 
them.344 
In fact, the Siebold Court expressly blessed the 1842 Apportionment Act. 
“No one will pretend,” it stated, “at least at the present day, that these laws 
were unconstitutional because they only partially covered the subject.”345 
The Court rejected concerns about Congress and states legislating on the 
same issue concurrently, because federal regulations are always 
“paramount” to state laws where the two conflict.346 The Court upheld the 
federal punishment of state officers for violating state laws, the violation 
of which was made punishable by the Enforcement Acts, because the state 
officers also owed duties to the United States and because Congress could 
effectively adopt state laws and “demand[] their fulfilment.”347 
 
341. See, e.g., Ellen D. Katz, Reinforcing Representation: Congressional Power to Enforce the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments in the Rehnquist and Waite Courts, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2341, 
2350–51 (2003) (cataloguing the substantial scholarship on the Court’s hollowing of the Fourteenth 
and Fifteenth Amendments). 
342. 100 U.S. 371 (1879). 
343. Id. at 377–79. 
344. Id. at 383–84 (emphasis in original). 
345. Id. at 384. 
346. Id.; see also id. at 386. 
347. Id. at 387–88. 
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For the first time, the Supreme Court in Siebold declared “that 
Congress has plenary and paramount jurisdiction over the whole subject” 
of federal elections.348 Like the lower court in Quinn, the Supreme Court 
rejected any suggestion that the absence of significant federal elections 
legislation prior to 1870 diminished Congress’s broad authority on the 
subject: 
If Congress has not, prior to the passage of the present laws, 
imposed any penalties to prevent and punish frauds and violations 
of duty committed by officers of election, it has been because the 
exigency has not been deemed sufficient to require it, and not 
because Congress had not the requisite power.349 
The Court acknowledged that the “exigency” had arrived: “In the light of 
recent history, and of the violence, fraud, corruption, and irregularity 
which have frequently prevailed at such elections, it may easily be 
conceived that the exertion of the power, if it exists, may be necessary to 
the stability of our frame of government.”350 In other words, voter 
intimidation and violence, fraud, and interference with election integrity 
had become issues of self-preservation for the federal government. 
The Supreme Court decided a companion case, Ex parte Clarke,351 on 
the same day as Siebold. An election officer had been convicted under the 
Enforcement Act for neglecting to convey a poll-book to the county clerk 
of court and for permitting the poll-book to be broken open.352 The Court 
upheld the conviction and denied the motion for habeas corpus, relying on 
its reasoning in Siebold.353 Justice Field, joined by Justice Clifford, 
dissented from the majority opinions in Siebold and Clarke, arguing, in 
part, that the Elections Clause’s “make or alter” power did not permit 
Congress to penalize violations of state law.354 Justice Field relied on the 
debates during the constitutional and state ratification conventions, 
pointing to language from the Framers that identified self-preservation as 
the primary purpose for the Clause.355 Justice Field also echoed the anti-
 
348. Id. at 388. 
349. Id. 
350. Id.; id. at 382. 
351. 100 U.S. 399 (1879). 
352. Id. at 400–01. 
353. Id. at 403–04 (“The principal question is, whether Congress had constitutional power to enact 
a law for punishing a State officer of election for the violation of his duty under a State statute in 
reference to an election of a representative to Congress. As this question has been fully considered in 
the previous case, it is unnecessary to add any thing further on the subject. Our opinion is, that 
Congress had constitutional power to enact the law; and that the cause of commitment was lawful and 
sufficient.”). 
354. Id. at 415–16 (Field, J., dissenting). 
355. Id. at 416–19. 
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commandeering arguments of the Framers and members of Congress who 
had urged limitations on, or at least a narrower interpretation of, the 
Elections Clause.356 Once again, however, this restrained view of 
Congress’s power under the Elections Clause was a minority opinion that 
did not carry the day. 
The Court reaffirmed its broad view of the Elections Clause in Ex parte 
Yarbrough,357 a unanimous opinion that upheld the Third Enforcement 
Act’s criminal provisions against conspiracy to intimidate federal voters 
and conspiracy to deny the “free exercise or enjoyment” of federal 
privileges or immunities.358 Eight men sought habeas relief after being 
convicted of conspiring to prevent Berry Saunders, a Black man, from 
voting in Georgia’s congressional election, and carrying out that 
conspiracy by violently assaulting Mr. Saunders on account of his race.359 
In response, the Court announced Congress’s unmitigated power to 
protect voters and the integrity of federal elections: 
If this government is anything more than a mere aggregation of 
delegated agents of other States and governments, each of which 
is superior to the general government, it must have the power to 
protect the elections on which its existence depends from violence 
and corruption. If it has not this power it is left helpless before the 
two great natural and historical enemies of all republics, open 
violence and insidious corruption.360 
Again rejecting the argument that Congress’s delay in deploying its 
Elections Clause authority diminished his power,361 the Court explained 
that Congress’s powers must include the authority to: “provide laws for 
the proper conduct of those elections[;]” “provide, if necessary, the 
officers who shall conduct them and make return of the result[;]” “to 
provide, in an election held under its own authority, for security of life 
and limb to the voter while in the exercise of this function[;]” and “protect 
the act of voting, the place where it is done, and the man who votes, from 
personal violence or intimidation and the election itself from corruption 
or fraud[.]”362 
Looking beyond “specific sources of the power to pass these laws[,]” 
the Court relied on fundamental principles of American democracy in a 
 
356. Id.  
357. 110 U.S. 651 (1884). 
358. Id. at 654–55 (quoting 70 Rev. Stat. § 5508). 
359. Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 655–57. 
360. Id. at 657–58. 
361. Id. at 660–61. 
362. Id. at 661; see also id. at 662 (“[I]t is the duty of that government to see that he may exercise 
this right freely, and to protect him from violence while so doing, or on account of so doing.”). 
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lofty conclusion: 
It is as essential to the successful working of this government that 
the great organisms of its executive and legislative branches 
should be the free choice of the people as that the original form 
of it should be so. . . . In a republican government, like ours, 
where political power is reposed in representatives of the entire 
body of the people, chosen at short intervals by popular elections, 
the temptations to control these elections by violence and by 
corruption is a constant source of danger. Such has been the 
history of all republics, and, though ours has been comparatively 
free from both these evils in the past, no lover of his country can 
shut his eyes to the fear of future danger from both sources.363 
Recognizing the profound terror and unrest inflicted throughout the South, 
the Court also predicted other election manipulations—namely, the 
distorting effect of money in politics—that were still to come.364 The 
Constitution must include the power to prevent against such “evils,” 
because if not “the country [is] in danger, and its best powers, its highest 
purposes, the hopes which it inspires, and the love which enshrines it, are 
at the mercy of the combinations of those who respect no right but brute 
force, on the one hand, and unprincipled corruptionists on the other.”365 
After Yarbrough, the Supreme Court continued to uphold the 
constitutionality of federal criminal penalties for voter intimidation and 
federal supervision of congressional elections.366 Lower federal courts 
likewise followed Siebold and Yarbrough, repeatedly recognizing the 
breadth of Congress’s constitutional authority to enact laws to ensure 
election integrity and protect the right of citizens to vote freely and 
 
363. Id. at 666–67. 
364. Id. at 667 (“If the recurrence of such acts as these prisoners stand convicted of are too common 
in one quarter of the country, and give omen of danger from lawless violence, the free use of money 
in elections, arising from the vast growth of recent wealth in other quarters, presents equal cause for 
anxiety.”). 
365. Id. 
366. See, e.g., Ex parte Coy, 127 U.S. 731, 752 (1888) (“[T]he power, under the constitution of the 
United States, of Congress to make such provisions as are necessary to secure the fair and honest 
conduct of an election at which a member of Congress is elected, as well as the preservation, proper 
return, and counting of the votes cast thereat, and, in fact, whatever is necessary to an honest and fair 
certification of such election, cannot be questioned. The right of Congress to do this, by adopting the 
statutes of the States, and enforcing them by its own sanctions, is conceded by counsel to be 
established.” (citing Ex parte Clarke, 100 U.S. 399 (1879))); Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 
293–94 (1892), abrogated on other grounds by Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968); United 
States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383, 386 (1915) (holding that criminal penalties for voter intimidation are 
constitutional because it is “unquestionable that the right to have one’s vote counted is as open to 
protection by Congress as the right to put a ballot in a box” (citing Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651; Logan, 
144 U.S. at 293)). 
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without interference.367 
B. The Wide Range of Elections Clause Powers 
As Congress and states began exercising their Elections Clause powers 
more regularly in the Twentieth Century, the Supreme Court repeatedly 
reasserted the extraordinary breadth of the “[t]imes, [p]laces, and 
[m]anner”368 authority under the provision and largely approved of 
legislation regulating a wide range of aspects of elections. 
In an oft-quoted passage, the Court affirmed in Smiley v. Holm369 that 
“[i]t cannot be doubted that” the “comprehensive words” of Article 1, 
Section 4 
embrace authority to provide a complete code for congressional 
elections, not only as to times and places, but in relation to 
notices, registration, supervision of voting, protection of voters, 
prevention of fraud and corrupt practices, counting of votes, 
duties of inspectors and canvassers, and making and publication 
of election returns.370 
Explicitly recognizing that this list was not exhaustive, the Court 
explained that the Elections Clause authorizes States “in short, to enact 
the numerous requirements as to procedure and safeguards which 
experience shows are necessary in order to enforce the fundamental right 
involved.”371 The Court went on to acknowledge that this broad power 
extended to Congress, which may issue “regulations of the same general 
character” as States and “may supplement these state regulations or may 
substitute its own” because Congress “has a general supervisory power 
over the whole subject.”372 The Court has also recognized that breadth of 
Congress’s power under the Elections Clause is further bolstered by the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.373 
Although it was never disputed that the Elections Clause included the 
power to draw and redraw districts, in Smiley, the Court held that nothing 
in the Elections Clause prohibited State redistricting legislation from 
 
367. See, e.g., Ex parte Geissler, 4 F. 188, 191 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1880); United States v. Munford, 16 
F. 223, 228 (C.C.E.D. Va. 1883); Ex parte Morrill, 35 F. 261, 265–66 (C.C.D. Or. 1888). 
368. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
369. 285 U.S. 355 (1932). 
370. Id. at 366.  
371. Id. 
372. Id. at 366–67 (citation omitted). 
373. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 320 (1941) (finding that the Necessary and Proper 
Clause “leaves to the Congress the choice of means by which its constitutional powers are to be carried 
into execution” in order to “safeguard the right of choice by the people of representatives in 
Congress”).  
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being subject to the governor’s veto power.374 In so holding, the Court 
implicitly accepted that the power to redistrict is part of the Elections 
Clause authority. Since Smiley, the Court has confirmed this conclusion 
explicitly. For example, in Wesberry v. Sanders,375 an apportionment 
challenge, the Court delved into the constitutional ratification debates and 
explained that the Framers intended the Elections Clause to give Congress 
the power to rectify the malapportionment that had developed in certain 
state legislatures and to “lay the state off into districts.”376 Even as it 
acknowledged that the breadth of Congress’s power under the Elections 
Clause was controversial during the constitutional debates, the Supreme 
Court has treated as undisputed that Article 1, Section 4 left “in state 
legislatures the initial power to draw districts for federal elections,” and 
“permitted Congress to ‘make or alter’ those districts if it wished.”377 The 
Court went on to list the many instances in which Congress had exercised 
such power, “in particular to restrain the practice of political 
gerrymandering.”378 
In addition to redistricting, the Court has recognized Congress’s power 
to issue regulations pertaining to voter registration,379 campaign finance 
 
374. Smiley, 285 U.S. at 372–73. 
375. 376 U.S. 1 (1964). 
376. Id. at 16 (quoting 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 57, at 71).  
377. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 275 (2004). 
378. Id. at 276–77; see also Rucho v. Common Cause, 588 U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2495 (2019) 
(“Congress has regularly exercised its Elections Clause power, including to address partisan 
gerrymandering.); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 122 (1970) (“The Framers expected Congress 
to use this power [in Article I, Section 4] to eradicate ‘rotten boroughs,’ and Congress has in fact used 
its power to prevent States from electing all Congressmen at large.”) (citations omitted); cf. Ariz. 
State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787, 824 (2015) (holding that the 
Elections Clause permitted Arizona voters to amend the state constitution by proposition to vest 
congressional redistricting power in the newly created Independent Redistricting Commission). 
379. Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 570 U.S. 1, 8–9 (2013) (“The Clause’s 
substantive scope is broad. ‘Times, Places, and Manner,’ we have written, are ‘comprehensive words,’ 
which ‘embrace authority to provide a complete code for congressional elections,’ including, as 
relevant here and as petitioners do not contest, regulations relating to ‘registration.’ . . . The power of 
Congress over the ‘Times, Places and Manner’ of congressional elections ‘is paramount, and may be 
exercised at any time, and to any extent which it deems expedient; and so far as it is exercised, and 
no farther, the regulations effected supersede those of the State which are inconsistent therewith.’”) 
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (quoting Smiley, 285 U.S., at 366; Ex parte Siebold, 
100 U.S. 371, 392 (1879)). 
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and corruption,380 primary elections,381 recounts,382 party affiliation 
rules,383 and balloting384 (so long as the balloting rule did not 
impermissibly attempt to regulate electoral outcomes). In each of these 
cases, the Court remarked on the comprehensive and wide-ranging scope 
of the Elections Clause power. 
The Court’s jurisprudence is muddier with respect to whether Congress 
can expand the electorate using its Elections Clause powers. In Oregon v. 
Mitchell,385 Justice Black, announcing the judgments for the Court, 
concluded that Congress can require states to permit 18-year-olds to vote 
in federal elections, but could not do so for state elections.386 Relying on 
the Elections Clause, as “augmented by the Necessary and Proper 
Clause,”387 Justice Black explained that 
[t]he breadth of power granted to Congress to make or alter 
election regulations in national elections, including the 
qualifications of voters, is demonstrated by the fact that the 
Framers of the Constitution and the state legislatures which 
ratified it intended to grant to Congress the power to lay out or 
alter the boundaries of the congressional districts.388 
Four justices agreed with Justice Black that Congress could lawfully 
require states to extend the franchise to eighteen-year-olds for federal 
 
380. Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 545–47 (1934) (relying heavily on Ex parte 
Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884), to uphold as constitutional the financial disclosure and reporting 
requirements of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 132 (1976) (“This 
Court has also held that it has very broad authority to prevent corruption in national Presidential 
elections.” (citing Burroughs, 290 U.S. 534)); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 13 (“The constitutional power of 
Congress to regulate federal elections is well established and is not questioned by any of the parties 
in this case.”); McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 187 (2003), overruled on other 
grounds by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (“Congress has a fully 
legitimate interest in maintaining the integrity of federal officeholders and preventing corruption of 
federal electoral processes through the means it has chosen.”). 
381. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 319–20 (1941) (overturning Newberry v. United States, 
256 U.S. 232 (1921)); see Buckley, 424 U.S. at 13 n.16 (recognizing that Classic overturned 
Newberry); Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 69–73, 71 n.2 (1997) (invalidating Louisiana’s “open 
primary” law because the law conflicted with time of elections set by federal statute pursuant to the 
Elections Clause). 
382. Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15, 24–25 (1972). 
383. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 736 (1974) (holding that a state can require that an independent 
candidate be unaffiliated with a political party for one year prior to a primary election). 
384. Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 523 (2001). 
385. 400 U.S. 112 (1970). 
386. Id. at 134–35. 
387. Id. at 120. 
388. Id. at 121. 
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elections, but did so on different grounds.389 Writing separately, Justice 
Stewart, with Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, agreed that 
Congress could regulate some voter qualifications through the Equal 
Protection Clause, but could not do so with respect to age because the state 
laws that set the voting age at twenty-one did not “invidiously 
discriminate against any discrete and insular minority.”390 
In Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut,391 the Supreme Court 
later confirmed that the Constitution does “not require a perfect symmetry 
of voter qualifications in state and federal legislative elections.”392 The 
Court unequivocally rejected the argument that the Voter Qualifications 
Clause requires identical voter qualifications in state and federal 
legislative elections as “plainly inconsistent” with Mitchell.393 However, 
Justice Stevens, with Justice Scalia, dissented and argued that the opinions 
of eight justices in Mitchell were consistent with the proposition that the 
Constitution “requires the same qualifications for state and federal 
elections.”394 More recently, justices have weighed in on this question, 
though in dicta or in minority opinions. For example, in a 2013 decision 
striking down Arizona’s law requiring would-be voters to provide proof 
of U.S. citizenship, Justice Scalia waded into the debate, writing that 
“Prescribing voting qualifications . . . forms no part of the power to be 
conferred upon the national government by the Elections Clause, which is 
expressly restricted to the regulation of the times, the places, and the 
manner of elections.”395 Notwithstanding nonbinding statements to the 
contrary, Mitchell and Tashijian represent the state of the law: Congress 
can expand the federal electorate beyond state law voter qualifications. 
Perfect symmetry is not required so long as all electors for the most 
 
389. See id. at 135–44 (Douglas, J., concurring) (finding Congress can compel states to permit 
eighteen-year-olds to vote in federal and state elections pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause and 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); id. at 239–81 (Brennan, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (writing with Justices White and Marshall, Justice Brennan 
dissented from the judgment insofar as it declared the age requirement unconstitutional as applied to 
state and local elections and concluded that Congress could compel states to extend the franchise to 
eighteen- to twenty-one-year-olds pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause). 
390. Id. at 293–96 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
391. 479 U.S. 208 (1986). 
392. Id. at 229. 
393. Id. The Voter Qualifications Clause provides: “The House of Representatives shall be 
composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors 
in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the 
State Legislature.” U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 1. 
394. Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 233 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
395. Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 570 U.S. 1, 17 (2013) (citations omitted) 
(emphases in original); see also id. at 29–33 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Husted v. A. Philip Randolph 
Inst., 584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1833, 1849–50 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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numerous state legislative body also qualify as electors for federal office. 
C. Exceptions to the Rule? 
Three cases run counter to the great weight of jurisprudence 
recognizing the Elections Clause as a broad grant of power to Congress; 
one of these cases has since been overturned and another has been called 
into question—by Justice Scalia in his majority opinion in Arizona v. Inter 
Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc.396 and by the sweep of history. 
In Newberry v. United States,397 the court struck down portions of the 
Federal Corrupt Practices Act that placed spending limits on spending in 
primaries or other nomination processes for federal office, in part because 
the term “elections” in Article I, Section 4 did not include primary 
elections because that procedure was “unknown” to the Framers.398 But 
the Court later rejected this rule in United States v. Classic,399 explaining 
that when the Elections Clause is “read in the sense which is plainly 
permissible and in the light of the constitutional purpose,” the Court was 
required “to hold that a primary election . . . is an election within the 
meaning of the constitutional provision and is subject to congressional 
regulation as to the manner of holding it.”400 The Classic Court explained 
that the Necessary and Proper Clause—when operating in conjunction 
with the Elections Clause—grants Congress the power to legislate to 
“safeguard the right of choice by the people of representatives in 
Congress.”401 
In United States v. Gradwell,402 the Court held that criminal prohibition 
of fraud against the United States did not extend to election fraud 
(specifically, bribery of electors).403 To reach this conclusion, the Court 
looked at Congress’s history of exercising its Elections Clause power to 
date, and noted that Congress had rarely interfered with state regulations 
of elections, except for a period of twenty-four years.404 The Court wrote 
off as an aberration the period from 1870 (when Congress issued muscular 
elections regulations though the Enforcement Acts) to 1894 (when 
Congress repealed a substantial portion of these laws as Reconstruction 
 
396. 570 U.S. 1 (2013). 
397. 256 U.S. 232 (1921). 
398. Id. at 250. 
399. 313 U.S. 299 (1941) 
400. Id. at 320. 
401. Id. 
402. 243 U.S. 476 (1917). 
403. Id. 
404. Id. at 482–84. 
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gave way to Redemption). The Court could not expressly state that 
Congress lacked the authority to regulate on congressional elections; 
instead, the Court explained that it was merely a matter of “policy” that 
had prevented Congress from doing so.405 Because Congress had 
previously exercised its election authority “by positive and clear statutes,” 
the Gradwell Court declined to read an election regulation into “a law for 
the protection of the revenue.”406 
In practice, Gradwell has not narrowed the Court’s interpretation of the 
Elections Clause. Indeed, in explaining why the presumption against 
preemption does not apply in Elections Clause cases, Justice Scalia 
limited Gradwell to its facts, explaining that the “provision at issue was 
adopted in a tax-enforcement bill, and that Congress had enacted but then 
repealed other criminal statutes specifically covering election fraud.”407 
Thus, “Gradwell says nothing at all about pre-emption, or about how to 
construe statutes (like the NVRA) in which Congress has indisputably 
undertaken ‘to regulate such elections.’”408 Indeed, Congress’s adoption 
of sweeping regulation of federal elections throughout the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries all but nullifies Gradwell. 
Finally, in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,409 the Court held that a 
state could not impose term limits on U.S. representatives or senators 
because the “Times, Places and Manner” authority granted to states did 
not contain the power to determine the qualifications for federal office.410 
Such power would contravene the intent of the Framers, who were 
motivated by “evident concern that States would try to undermine the 
National Government.”411 Justice Stevens several times noted that the 
Elections Clause was intended to grant Congress control over the 
“procedural” aspects of elections (i.e., how elections are run), rather than 
the “substantive” qualifications of candidates for office.412 But it would 
be a mistake to read Justice Stevens’s focus on election procedure too 
narrowly, given the Framers’ emphasis on the breadth of the Elections 
Clause (e.g., “words of great latitude”), the intent to protect against voter 
 
405. Id. at 482 (“Although Congress has had this power of regulating the conduct of congressional 
elections from the organization of the government, our legislative history upon the subject shows that 
except for about twenty-four of the one hundred and twenty-eight years since the government was 
organized, it has been its policy to leave such regulations almost entirely to the states, whose 
representatives Congressmen are.”). 
406. Id. at 485. 
407. Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 570 U.S. 1, 13 n.5 (2013) (emphasis in original). 
408. Id. (emphasis in original). 
409. 514 U.S. 779 (1995). 
410. Id. at 828. 
411. Id. at 810. 
412. Id. at 810, 832–35.  
Sweren-Becker & Waldman (Do Not Delete) 10/11/2021  4:05 PM 
1062 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96:997 
 
suppression and intimidation, and early Elections Clause legislation 
(approved by the Supreme Court) aimed at ensuring free and fair 
elections.413 
D. Who Is a “Legislature”? 
The most voluble recent Supreme Court jurisprudence on the Clause 
has addressed what once seemed like a quirky, ancillary issue. The 
Republican legislature challenged Arizona’s nonpartisan redistricting 
commission, which had been established by ballot measure under the 
state’s constitution.414 The commission violated the Elections Clause, the 
lawsuit insisted, because only the “legislature” could set the “times, 
places, and manner” of balloting and districts—and the voters were not 
the legislature.415 This argument, if successful, would have put at risk 
numerous other ballot measures in states across the country, especially in 
western states that joined the Union in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth Centuries, with direct democracy as part of their constitutions. 
In Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting 
Commission,416 by 5–4, the Court ruled that the Constitution did not bar 
the people of Arizona from direct democracy when it came to the method 
for drawing district lines. “The history and purpose of the Clause weigh 
heavily against such preclusion, as does the animating principle of our 
Constitution that the people themselves are the originating source of all 
the powers of government.”417 Ominously for future jurisprudence, 
Justice Anthony Kennedy joined the majority. Chief Justice John Roberts 
wrote a stinging dissent, arguing that “legislature” must mean only the 
representative body.418 Kennedy’s retirement augured a future Supreme 
Court ruling striking down dozens of state election procedures and 
provisions enacted by voters over the decades. 
However, in Rucho, even as Roberts wrote that the courts could not 
police partisan gerrymandering, he acknowledged that Congress and state 
voters could. At length he cited with approval how 
numerous . . . States are restricting partisan considerations in 
districting through legislation. One way they are doing so is by 
placing power to draw electoral districts in the hands of 
independent commissions. For example, in November 2018, 
 
413. See supra Parts I–II.  
414. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787 (2015). 
415. Id. at 792–93. 
416. 576 U.S. 787 (2015).  
417. Id. at 813. 
418. Id. at 825–50 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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voters in Colorado and Michigan approved constitutional 
amendments creating multimember commissions that will be 
responsible in whole or in part for creating and approving district 
maps for congressional and state legislative districts. Missouri is 
trying a different tack. Voters there overwhelmingly approved the 
creation of a new position—state demographer—to draw state 
legislative district lines.419 
These measures are constitutionally indistinguishable from the ones put 
at risk in Arizona. 
Litigation on this question took center stage in the months leading up 
to, and following, the 2020 general elections. Faced with the difficulties 
of holding elections in the midst of the coronavirus pandemic, governors, 
secretaries of state, state election boards, county election administrators, 
and courts issued executive orders, rules, and interpretations to ensure that 
voters could safely cast ballots that would count. As a result, there were 
at least forty-three cases, in both federal and state court, in which parties 
challenged an election rule or procedure on the grounds that the entity 
issuing the regulation or interpretation was not entitled to make rules as 
to the times, places, or manner of federal elections under the Elections 
and/or Electors Clauses.420 Opining on voting cases that bubbled up to the 
Supreme Court’s 2020 “shadow docket,” four justices indicated their 
support for the independent state legislature theory, under which only the 
formal legislative body of a state would be permitted to regulate federal 
elections under the Elections and Electors Clauses.421 These views 
contradict the Court’s majority opinions in Arizona Independent 
Redistricting Commission and Rucho, the practice of election 
administration nationally, and the unmistakable original intent of the 
Elections Clause to limit the power of state lawmakers, whom the Framers 
fundamentally distrusted. Ultimately, the Court denied the petitions for 
certiorari arising from these cases.422 
CONCLUSION: THE ELECTIONS CLAUSE TODAY 
One remarkable feature of the Founding-era debates on the Elections 
Clause is their resonance today. Madison’s well-known warning that 
partisan factions in the States would write laws to entrench themselves 
 
419. Rucho v. Common Cause, 588 U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2507 (2019) (citation omitted). 
420. Voting Rights Litigation Tracker 2020, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., https://www.brennancent 
er.org/our-work/court-cases/voting-rights-litigation-2020 [https://perma.cc/TE5M-3QX5] (last 
updated July 28, 2021). 
421. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
422. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
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still echoes profoundly: “Whenever the State Legislatures had a favorite 
measure to carry, they would take care so to mould [sic] their regulations 
as to favor the candidates they wished to succeed.”423 
For example, rules to limit ballot-access—including stricter voter 
identification requirements for in-person voting, stricter voter-registration 
requirements, and curtailment of early-voting opportunities—are 
advanced predominantly by one political party, often crafted to exclude 
some voters, and based on a premise about the relationship between 
turnout and electoral outcomes.424 At the same time, partisan 
gerrymandering designed to entrench political parties has plagued 
Maryland, Michigan, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin 
amidst the heightened partisanship of recent years,425 consistent with 
Theophilus Parsons’ prediction that “in times of popular commotion, and 
when faction and party spirit run high,” States “would introduce such 
regulations as would render the rights of the people insecure and of little 
value” including making “unequal and partial division of the State into 
districts for the election of representatives.”426 Indeed, even as the 
Supreme Court in Rucho ruled that claims of partisan gerrymandering are 
nonjusticiable, the Court acknowledged that electoral districting problems 
in part animated the Framers’ desire for the Elections Clause. And the 
Court squarely stated that “the Framers gave Congress the power to do 
something about partisan gerrymandering in the Elections Clause.”427 The 
Court pointed specifically to the For the People Act of 2019 as an example 
of proposed legislation that would create such districting regulations and 
noted that the avenue for reform “remains open” in Congress.428 
Along with redistricting reform, the For the People Act and the 
Freedom to Vote Act include provisions related to methods of voter 
registration, early voting, restoration of eligibility to people with past 
 
423. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
424. Samuel Issacharoff, Ballot Bedlam, 64 DUKE L.J. 1363, 1370 (2015) (“[T]he single predictor 
necessary to determine whether a state will impose voter-access restrictions is whether Republicans 
control the ballot-access process. This is not intended as a normative claim, but simply as a real-world 
fact of life.”). 
425.  PEW RSCH. CTR., THE PARTISAN DIVIDE ON POLITICAL VALUES GROWS EVEN WIDER 7 
(2017), https://www.people-press.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2017/10/10-05-2017-Political-
landscape-release-updt..pdf [https://perma.cc/J9BV-KC9Z] (“The gap between the political values of 
Democrats and Republicans is now larger than at any point in Pew Research Center surveys dating 
back to 1994, a continuation of a steep increase in the ideological divisions between the two parties 
over more than a decade.”). 
426. DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, reprinted in VOL. 6: 
MASSACHUSETTS 3, supra note 55, at 1218.  
427. Rucho v. Common Cause, 588 U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2508 (2019). 
428. Id.; see H.R. 1, 116th Cong. §§ 2401, 2411 (2019). 
Sweren-Becker & Waldman (Do Not Delete) 10/11/2021  4:05 PM 
2021] THE ELECTIONS CLAUSE 1065 
 
convictions, and election security.429 Arguments that the Elections Clause 
is not broad enough to authorize these reforms would give the Framers 
and early members of Congress déjà vu. For example, the president of the 
Public Interest Legal Foundation testified that the Elections Clause “was 
only added” to the Constitution “when concerns were raised that the states 
would suffocate the power of the new government by refusing to establish 
procedures to elect federal officials”—a circumstance that “simply does 
not exist, and therefore should not justify a federal takeover of election 
procedures.”430 Not only does this argument reflect a very narrow slice of 
the historical record, but it has been advanced and defeated—repeatedly. 
The Framers of the Constitution declined to adopt Rutledge and 
Pinckney’s proposed amendment to excise federal authority to alter state 
elections regulations. Then, during state ratification, six states tried and 
failed to amend the constitution to limit Congress’s power to apply only 
when States entirely failed to enact elections regulations. The first 
Congress likewise tried and failed to amend the Constitution to grant 
elections authority only in instances of state default. Rather than adopt 
such a limited construction, Madison, the Framers, and early Congresses 
understood (sometimes to their chagrin) that the Elections Clause 
contained “words of great latitude” and that Congress’s authority was not 
limited to circumstances in which states entirely refused to enact rules for 
congressional elections. The national self-preservation that the Elections 
Clause was intended to provide has always meant more than merely 
holding congressional elections.431 
Partisan manipulation of district boundaries is just one tactic used to 
dilute the power of voters and suppress votes. Voters face myriad burdens 
and inconveniences, from strict voter identification laws and registration 
 
429. For the People Act, H.R. 1, 117th Cong. (2021); Freedom to Vote Act, S. 2747, 117th Cong. 
(2021). 
430. For the People Act: Hearing on H.R. 1 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 3 
(2019) (statement of J. Christian Adams, President and General Counsel, Public Interest Legal 
Foundation), https://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU00/20190129/108824/HHRG-116-JU00-
Wstate-AdamsJ-20190129-U1.pdf [https://perma.cc/N7KX-N2BN]. 
431. See, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 800 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (“[A]s much injury might 
result to the Union from improper regulations, as from a neglect or refusal to many any.”); see also 
CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 407 (1842) (“[T]he Government is almost as much dissolved by 
a vicious representation as by no representation. In the latter case, to be sure, the whole fabric is 
destroyed; in the former, you preserve the show, the appearance, the form of our Government, but the 
spirit and lite are gone.”); CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 1283 (1871) (“Who does not know that 
if the State Legislature should choose to incumber the exercise of this power with inconvenient or 
impossible conditions, and if the national Congress had not the power to overrule or alter such 
conditions, the nation would perish?”); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 382 (1879) (“In the light of 
recent history, and of the violence, fraud, corruption, and irregularity which have frequently prevailed 
at such elections, it may easily be conceived that the exertion of the power, if it exists, may be 
necessary to the stability of our frame of government.”). 
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requirements, to aggressive voter roll purges and limited voting hours and 
locations. Framers who worried that States, if unrestricted, would situate 
polling places at inconvenient locations would be unsurprised by the rash 
of polling place closures since 2013, when the Supreme Court gutted the 
federal government’s most potent tool for fighting race-based voter 
suppression—the preclearance requirement of the Voting Rights Act.432 
Indeed, one essayist during the state ratification debates expressly warned 
that, without federal mediation, a State would “appoint[] a place for 
holding the elections, which would prevent some from attending, and 
burthen [sic] others with very great inconveniences.”433 
It is disheartening that abuse of state power over elections, partisan 
manipulation of district lines, and myriad forms of voter intimidation and 
suppression (precisely the harms the Framers hoped to avoid by drafting 
the Elections Clause into the Constitution) persist. But there is reason for 
optimism. The historical record of the Elections Clause—at the nation’s 
founding, in early Congresses, and in the courts—demonstrates that 
Congress and states have the power to deliver on the promise of free and 
fair elections that the Framers intended. 
 
432. See THE LEADERSHIP CONF. EDUC. FUND, DEMOCRACY DIVERTED: POLLING PLACE 
CLOSURES AND THE RIGHT TO VOTE 12 (2019), http://civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/reports/Democracy-
Diverted.pdf [https://perma.cc/XVL3-A8XT] (finding 1,688 polling place closures between 2012 and 
2018 in jurisdictions formerly covered by the preclearance formula of the Voting Rights Act); Shelby 
Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013) (invalidating the formula that determined which states and 
jurisdictions were covered by section 5 of the Voting Rights Act and thus are required to undergo 
preclearance, effectively ending the preclearance requirement).  
433. THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, reprinted in 
VOL. 5: MASSACHUSETTS 2, supra note 87, at 738. 
